



the situation-type described by the *that*-clause. *The case* itself appears to be the term with which the speaker refers to the relevant situation, a situation that may be delimited by location modifiers in sentence-initial position. The *is the case*-construction also has the purpose of facilitating quantification over truthmaking situations, as with adverbs of quantification.

In a sense, this account is entirely deflationary regarding *is the case*: the *is the case*-construction involves no truth predicate, but only helps to refer to a particular situation relative to which the *that*-clause is asserted.

The Austinian account of *is the case*-sentences raises the question of the semantics of nominal *case*-constructions, as below:

(8) a. In case it rains, we won't go. In that case, we will stay home.

b. We discussed the case that he will return.

'Cases' when referred to in that way are neither events nor facts (and thus not part of the world): they neither 'take place' (like events) nor 'obtain' (like facts) (but may just 'present themselves'). They are best viewed as the obtaining of a propositional content relative to a possible situation (or set of possible situations), that is, as merely possible facts.

The *is a fact*-construction shares with *is true*-sentences their resistance of location modifiers, adverbs of quantification, as well as past and future tense:

(9) a. ?? In many European countries it is still a fact that women can wear a burka.

b. ??? In our firm it is never a fact that someone gets fired without explanation.

c. ?? It is sometimes a fact that someone is absent.

d. ??? It was twice a fact that someone was absent.

e. ??? It will often be a fact that I forget something.

f. ?? It was once a fact that no one knew of Michael Jackson.

The *that*-clause in a *is a fact*-construction is in fact treated as indexically complete: if a fact obtains, it is regardless of circumstances. I think the semantics of *is a fact*-sentences is best illuminated by considering first the construction *the fact that S*. *The fact that S* clearly refers to fact in the Strawsonian sense, according to which facts correspond to true propositions. (Note that *S* in *the fact that S* can be disjunctive, negative, or quantificational.) I will assume that *that S* in *the fact that S* occurs quasi-quotationally, parallel to *ach* in the German word *ach*. Moreover, *fact* will have a reifying function, mapping the mentioning of *S* onto a fact. Both noun phrases (which share a range of linguistic peculiarities) alternate with subject-predicate sentences (*Ach is a German word, that S is a fact*). The special use of the *that*-clause is reflected in its inability to be replaced by *what John said*:

(10) a. ?? What John said is a fact.

By contrast such a replacement is allowed in *is the case*-sentences, as Austin had noted:

(10) b. What John said is the case.

How does Wittgenstein's dictum then far on this analysis?

(11) The world is everything that is the case.

Not too well, actually. While *everything that S* in predicate position can very well act as a description of a totality (*This is everything he gave me*), the world could not possibly be identical to a totality of propositions or situation types. I think this may not actually be a problem for the analysis. Wittgenstein's sentence may simply not be entirely correct semantically. One indication for that is a sentence like (12) below does not sound right:

(12) ?? That situation is what was the case then.

Another indication is that French translators generally use *se passer*, an existence predicate for events, rather than *est le cas*, to translate the Wittgensteinian sentence:

(13) Le monde est tout ce qui se passe.

To conclude, natural language expressions of truth appear to reflect several notions, not just a property or quasi-property of truth, but also an Austinian notion of truth relative to a situation as well as a Strawsonian notion of a fact based on a true proposition.