**Chapter 6**

**Levels of Linguistic Acts and the Semantics of Saying and Quoting**

Vresion September, 2023

Attitudinal–objects semantics of attitude reports has an important extension to verbs of saying and to quotation, based on an extension of the domain of modal and attitudinal objects to speech-related objects. This extension makes use of Austin’s (1962) insight that illocutionary acts are performed by performing lower-level linguistic acts, in particular locutionary acts (roughly, acts of conveying a content without commitment) and phatic acts (roughly, acts of uttering expressions, with a particular conceptual meaning). Just as illocutionary acts come with illocutionary objects, locutionary acts come with locutionary objects (‘uuterances’, what we may refer to as ‘sayings’) and phatic acts with phatic objects (what we also refer to as ‘tokens’). As with attitudinal objects in general, it is locutionary and phatic objects that play the semantically important role.

 Verbs of saying include *say, write, whisper, scream, repeat,* and *praise*, as well as *think*, a locutionary verb in the realm of the mental. Verbs of saying all take *that*-clauses as complements as in (1a), as well as pure quotes as in (1b), and direct quotes as (1c):

(1) a. John said that he won the race.

 b. John said ‘shh’.

 c. John said ‘I won the race’.

Like basic attitude verbs, verbs of saying display the Substitution Problem, illustrated in (2a)., though they permit special quantifiers, as in (2b), which is a valid conclusion of (1a), (1b), as well as (1c). Special quantifiers with non-mental locutionary verbs include NPs headed by *word(s),* that is, *words*-NPs, as in (2c):

(2) a. \* John said a proposition / a content / a sentence / a verb.

 b. John said something.

 c. John said a few words.

The main idea for the semantics of verbs of saying is that their complements (*that*-clauses or pure or direct quotes) may express not just content-related properties (specifying satisfaction conditions), but also form-related properties, to be predicated of phatic objects.[[1]](#footnote-1) While *that*-clause complements of verbs of saying act as predicates of locutionary objects, giving their satisfaction conditions, pure quotes as complements of verbs of saying as in (1b) act as predicates of phatic objects specifying their form. Direct quotes as in (1c) act as predicates of complexes of phatic and locutionary objects, specifying their form as well as their content. A similar account may apply to mixed quotation (*Mary ‘resides’ in Munich*).

 By extending the ontological domain to locutionary and phatic objects, attitudinal-objects semantics allows for a unified account of attitude verbs and verbs of saying with their various sorts of complements.

 Making use of phatic objects of different kinds and taking quotations to serve as predicates of phatic objects furthermore promises a novel, unified compositional semantics of quotation of the different sorts. Pure quotes on that semantics convey properties of phatic objects, and direct quotes and perhaps mixed quotes convey properties of both phatic and locutionary objects. Meanings of quotes as properties of such objects can be obtained compositionally, it will be suggested, based on a novel type of syntactic structure where lower-level linguistic structures (phonetic, phonological or morpho-syntactic structures) form part of the syntactic structure of the sentence that is input to interpretation (Logical Form or LF, in the tradition of generative syntax).

 The main part of this chapter will consist in elaborating the ontology of locutionary and phatic objects and extending attitudinal-objects semantics to verbs of saying with their various complements (including special NPs headed by *word(s)*).In a more sketchy final part, I will outline the semantics of quotational complements against the background of a novel conception of their syntax and their semantic composition.

1**. The ontology of locutionary and phatic objects**

**1.1. Austin’s levels of linguistic acts**

Illocutionary acts (acts of asserting, requesting, promising, or asking a question) are performed by performing lower-level linguistic acts, acts of uttering sentences with a particular structure and words with particular lexical meanings. This hierarchy of linguistic acts plays a central role in Austin’s (1962) theory of speech acts. Austin distinguished first of all *locutionary acts* as acts below the level of illocutionary acts. He further distinguished between *rhetic act*s, acts (roughly) of uttering the words in the sentence with a specific meaning and reference, *phatic act*s, acts of uttering words, and  *phonetic act*s, acts of producing sounds. For Austin locutionary acts consist of rhetic, phatic, and phonetic acts.

 Rhetic acts are meaning-related acts below the level of illocutionary acts. They are characterized as acts of using words with a specific meaning or reference.[[2]](#footnote-2) For a given use of a sentence a rhetic act could not generally be a single act. Rather it generally consists of a plurality of acts involving the words or relevant constituents of the sentence.[[3]](#footnote-3) This in turn could not be a mere plurality of acts of using the words in the sentence, but only a coordinated or structured plurality of acts of using expressions with particular meanings *and* with semantically relevant relations that will lead to the composition of the meaning of the sentence. A rhetic act thus is best taken to be a plurality of acts of conveying semantic values of subsentential expressions *as* entering relations leading to the composition of the meaning of the entire sentence. The product of such a plurality of acts will itself be a plurality of products, namely products of meaning-related acts involving subsentential occurrences of expressions in a particular meaningful configuration. Natural language as a matter of fact reflects products of rhetic acts as pluralities, not as single entities, namely, with plural *words*-NPs (*a few words, those words*), as we will see in the next section.

 The linguistic acts of the various levels are ordered by a grounding relation, what one may call the *by*-relation or what Goldman’s (1970) calls the relation of ‘level-generation’. That is, an illocutionary act is performed by performing a locutionary act, a locutionary act by performing a phatic act. The *by*-relation, symbolized by ‘∠’,orders spatio-temporally coincident acts.[[4]](#footnote-4)

 Phatic acts come with products as well, even though they do not have satisfaction conditions. Products of phatic acts will be bearers of phonologically, morpho-syntactically or semantically relevant properties as opposed to the various properties that can be borne by performances. The distinction between phatic acts and phatic objects may be harder to accept. However, the action-product distinction clearly applies more generally to performances with aesthetic aims: a musical performance comes with a product as entity that just carries aesthetic relevant features, as opposed to the ‘mere’ performance that carries properties irrelevant for aesthetic evaluation.

**1.2. The distinction between illocutionary and locutionary objects**

Not strictly following Austin, I take locutionary objects to be the products of acts of saying, the sorts of entities described by verbs of saying (locutionary verbs) when taking *that*-clause complements. Verbs of saying include neutral verbs of saying (*say, write, think*), verbs of manner of speaking (*whisper, scream*), discourse-related verbs of saying (*repeat, comment,* and *remark*), and verbs of saying with an attitude (*praise, criticize, boast*).[[5]](#footnote-5) Locutionary acts are acts of saying something, or presenting or considering a content without commitment to its truth. Thus a locutionary act of saying is an act of putting forward a content without that amounting to an assertion, for example.

 Just as there are illocutionary objects that correspond to illocutionary acts, there are locutionary objects, ‘sayings’ or ‘utterances’, that correspond to locutionary acts. Locutionary objects can be constitutive of illocutionary objects of different forces.

 The way locutionary objects are to be conceived will be guided by how they are reflected in natural language, given the approach of descriptive metaphysics on which this book is based. Locutionary objects are just as well-reflected in natural language as illocutionary objects. Locutionary objects are the sorts of things special quantifiers range over when they are complements of verbs of saying and that free relative clauses like *what John said* refer to. As such locutionary objects, we can observe, come with truth conditions:

(3) What John said / whispered / screamed is true.

Given that having truth conditions means coming with a word/mind-to world direction of fit, locutionary objects cannot be considered force-neutral acts below illocutionary acts; rather they are best viewed as constative acts with a very weak assertive force, involving no commitment to truth beyond the act. That is, unlike claims, locutionary objects do not come with validity.

 The distinction between illocutionary and locutionary objects is strikingly well reflected in natural language, in the unacceptability of reports of content-sharing among locutionary and illocutionary verbs. Thus, (4a) is impossible as a report of sharing the contents reported in (4b) and (4c), and so for (5) – (7):

(4) a. ??? John asserted what Mary said.

 b. John asserted that Bill won the race.

 c. Mary said that Bill won the race.

(5) a. ??? John said what Mary demanded.

 b. John demanded that Bill should leave.

 c. Mary said that Bill should leave.

(6) a. ??? John said what Mary asked

 b. John said ‘Did Bill win?’.

 c. Mary asked ‘Did Bill win?’.

(7) a. ??? John promised what he said.

 b. John promised that he would help Mary.

 c. John said that he would help Mary.

Reports of sharing as in (4a, 5a, 6a, 7a) make use of special quantifiers or pronouns standing for kinds of locutionary or illocutionary objects. In those reports, the one verb requires an illocutionary object and the other a locutionary object, which cannot be identical and thus lead to the unacceptability of such sentences. For example, in (4a), *what Mary said* stands for a (kind of) saying, and that cannot be a (kind of) assertion.

 Note that given (4a), John may have asserted that Bill won the race, yet he also ‘said’ that Bill won the race, and (4a) only reports the lower-level speech act of the saying.

 The impossibility of sharing also holds for locutionary verbs of manner of speaking and illocutionary verbs:

(8) a. ?? Mary asserted what John said, that Bill won the race.

 b. ?? Mary claimed what Bill whispered, that Bill is the winner.

 The impossibility of sharing with locutionary and illocutionary verbs matches the necessary falsity of the identity statements below:

(9) a. ??? John’s utterance is his claim.

 b. ??? Mary’s scream is her assertion.

 The distinction between locutionary and illocutionary objects extends to the realm of the mental. Acts of thinking are locutionary acts in the realm of the mental and thoughts the corresponding locutionary objects. Acts like acts of deciding are on a par with illocutionary acts, involving a commitment to act. The observation then is that reports of sharing with *think* and *decide* are likewise impossible. Thus, (10a) is unacceptable as a conclusion of (10b) and (10c), as well as of (10d) and (10e):

(10) a. ??? John thought what Bill decided.

 b. Bill decided that they should leave the house.

 c. John thought that they should leave the house.

 d. Bill decided ‘let’s leave the house!’.

 e. John thought ‘let’s leave the house!’.

Decisions are on a par with illocutionary objects such as promises and requests, by carrying satisfaction conditions with a world–to-word/mind direction of fit. They are based on locutionary objects of the sort of thoughts, but they cannot be the identical to thoughts.

 Reports of sharing are also impossible with *think* and mental state verbs like *hope, believe,* and *desire*, which thus side with illocutionary verbs:

(11) ??? Bill thought what Mary hoped / believed / desired, that the house would be sold.

 To conclude, just as locutionary objects such as utterances, sayings, whispers and screams are entities distinct from illocutionary objects such as assertions, locutionary objects in the realm of the mental, thoughts, are distinct from mental objects such as decisions, hopes, beliefs, and desires.

**1.3. The basic semantics of locutionary *say* and phatic *say***

On the extension of attitudinal-objects semantics to verbs of saying, locutionary and phatic objects play basically the same semantic role as attitudinal objects in attitude reports. Locutionary objects are involved in the semantics of verbs of saying when they take *that*-clause complements, phatic objects when verbs of saying take pure quotes as complements. Locutionary and phatic uses are available with both simple and complex verbs of saying, including manner-of-speaking verbs, and response-stance verbs such as *repeat*.

 This gives reason to adopt the same sort of syntactic structure for reports of saying as for attitude reports given in Chapter 5. That is, locutionary and phatic verbs of saying involve an underlying structure involving a light verb-noun combination. For *say*, which is not overtly derived from a noun, the noun will be an abstract noun SAID, dividing into locutionary SAIDloc and phatic SAIDphat. Thus, (12a) with locutionary *say* will have the underlying structure (12b), which will be interpreted as in (12c):

 (12) a. John said that Mary is happy.

 b. John do [NP SAIDloc [that Mary is happy]]]

 c. ∃d(do(John, d) & SAIDloc(d) & prop([*that Mary is happy*])(d))

(13a) with phatic *say* will have the underlying structure (13b), which will be interpreted as in in (13c):

(13) a. John said ‘great’.

 b. John do [NP SAIDphat [‘great’]]

 c. ∃d(do(John, d) & SAIDphat(d) & [*‘great’*](d))

That is, both *that*-clauses and pure quotes as complements of verbs of saying act as predicates, namely of locutionary and of phatic objects respectively.

 Support for this analysis comes from the fact that the Substitution Problem arises with locutionary and phatic verbs of saying just as with attitude verbs like *claim* and *believe*. Thus, locutionary *say* disallows substitution of a *that-*clause by a full DP standing for any entity whatsoever:

(14) a. Mary said that Bill could help.

 b. ??? John said that proposition / that entity / that utterance / that suggestion as well.

Likewise phatic *say* disallows replacement of a pure quote by an ordinary expression-referring or utterance-referring DP:

(15) a. John said ‘come’.

 b. ??? Mary said that expression / that sentence / the verb ‘come’ / that utterance.

Phatic *say* differs in that respect from *utter*, which is an ordinary transitive verb that takes expressions as arguments, as denoted by ordinary expression-referring terms:[[6]](#footnote-6)

(16) John uttered that expression / that sentence / that word.

As an ordinary transitive verb *utter* does not give rise to the Substitution Problem.

 The difference between *say* and *utter* manifests itself also in that *utter* and *say* cannot co-occur in reports of sharing:

(17) ??? John uttered what Mary said, ‘Ich liebe dich’.

Whereas *utter* is an ordinary transitive verb, taking an expression as an argument, phatic *say* has the underlying structure and semantics of attitude verbs. With *utter*, direct quotes act as referential arguments referring to expressions; with phatic *say*, they act as predicates of the phatic object that is being described.

 Pure quotation complements may also act as predicates of conceptual objects, products of rhetic, concept-conveying acts, namely with the verb *mean*, as in (18a), with an agentive subject referent, and as in (18b), with an expression type as subject referent:

(18) a. By ‘dislike’ John meant ‘hate’.

 b. ‘Rouge’ means ‘red’.

On both uses *mean* disallows substitution of the complement by an explicit concept-referring term, but allows substitution by special quantifiers:

(19) a. ??? By ‘dislike’ John meant the meaning of ‘hate’.

 b. ??? ‘Red’ means the concept ‘red’.

 c. ‘Red’ means something.

The logical form of (18b) will be parallel to that of (13a), namely as in (20b), based on the underlying structure in (20a) with an abstract nominal root MEAN:

(20) a. Rouge’ have [NP MEAN ‘red’]

 b. ∃d(have(‘rouge’, d) & MEAN(d) & [*‘red’*](d))

The Substitution Problems arises for locutionay verbs just as it does for phatic verbs, including when they convey conceptual meaning.

**1.4. Pure quotations as predicates**

The view of pure quotations as predicates of phatic objects deviates from current views of pure quotations. On current views, pure quotes are expression-referring terms, managing, in some way, to refer to the relevant expression type, by acting as descriptions (Geach 1970), as names (Reichenbach 1947), by involving a demonstrative (the quotation marks) which points to a displayed token (Davidson 1967, 1979, Cappelen/Lepore 2007, Clark/Gerrig 1990, de Vries 2008), or by ‘presenting’ the expression type (Washington 1992, Saka 1998). The present view is that pure quotations may, but need not, act as referential terms. Their primary rather is predicative and not referential, since pure quotations express properties of particular phatic or phonetic objects.

 There is specific syntactic evidence that quotations may occur as syntactic predicates, namely from *as*-phrases modifying the verbs *translate* and *pronounce*:

(21) a. Mary translated red as ‘rouge’.

 b. Sue pronounced ‘red’ as ‘rett’.

*As* requires predicative rather than referential complements (*John as a father /\*as him, Mary treated John as a brother / \* as him*), which means the pure quotations in (21a, b) must have predicative status.[[7]](#footnote-7) *As*-phrases can also act as adnominal modifiers of the corresponding product nominalizations, which are nouns denoting phatic objects:

(22) a. the translation of ‘red’ as ‘rouge’

 b. the pronounciation of ‘red’ as ‘rett’

This supports an analysis on which the *as*-phrases in (21a, b) act as predicates of phatic objects as well, those described by the verbs *translate* and *pronounce*. In (21a), the property expressed by *‘rouge’*, a property of phatic objects, is predicated of ‘the translation’, the product of the acts involved in translating, and in (21b) the property expressed *‘rett’*, a property of phonetic objects, is predicated of the ‘pronounciation’, the product of an act of pronouncing

. Standard views of quotations fail to recognize a predicative function of pure quotations, but assume that pure quotes always act as referential terms.[[8]](#footnote-8) The present view accommodates the predicative function of pure quotation naturally.

**1.5. The distinction between locutionary and phatic acts**

Phatic verbs of saying take pure quotes as complements, whereas locutionary verbs take *that-*clauses as complements; pure quotes act as predicates of phatic objects, whereas *that*-clause complements of locutionary verbs act as predicates of locutionary objects. How is the distinction between phatic and locutionary objects to be understood? I will not strictly follow Austin’s own (not always consistent) characterization of different acts below the level of locutionary acts but rather introduce notions of my own, using in part Austin’s terms.

 Phatic acts are form-related acts, consisting of the utterance of simple and complex expressions with the intention of realizing a particular linguistic structure. Phatic acts include phonological and morpho-syntactic acts, that is, acts with the intention of realizing a phonological or a morpho-syntactic structure. They also include acts of uttering words with particular intended lexical meanings. The product of a phatic act carries only relevant form-related features (such as phonological or morpho-syntactic features), whereas the act may carry irrelevant performance-related features.[[9]](#footnote-9)

 A locutionary act is an act of saying something or thinking something, as an act displaying a truth-directed content. A locutionary act thus won’t include a form-related act (unlike what Austin sometimes suggests). As mentioned in Section 1.2., the motivation for taking locutionary acts to be truth-directed is linguistic. Thus, free relative clauses with verbs of saying describe objects that have truth conditions, as in (23a). Such free relative clauses do not seem to be able to describe objects with fulfillment conditions, though, as suggested by (23b):[[10]](#footnote-10), [[11]](#footnote-11)

(23) a. What John said / wrote is true.

 b. ??? What John said / wrote cannot be fulfilled.

The absence of fulfilment conditions holds even if what John said served to make a promise. It is the promise that has fulfilment conditions, not the locutionary object that is the saying and on which the promise is based:

(24) a. What John promised cannot be fulfilled.

 b. ??? What John said cannot be fulfilled.

The absence of fulfilment conditions manifests itself also in the fact that only *that*-clauses can give the content of locutionary objects, as in (25a), not interrogative complements (describing a question), as in (25b), or infinitival complements (describing a request), as in (25c):

(25) a. John said /wrote / thought that he will leave.

 b. \* John said / wrote thought what Bill should do.

 c. \* John said / wrote / thought for Bill to leave.

 The fact that locutionary objects have truth conditions and not fulfilment conditions does not mean that they can be part only of assertions. Reports of locutionary acts such as (26) allow for illocutionary acts such as threats and promises being performed:

(26) John said / wrote that he will leave.

 Locutionary objects differ from phatic objects not only in having truth conditions, but also in having a part structure based on partial content. The two different readings of *part of* in (27a) and (27b) make that clear:

(27) a. Part of what John said is true.

 b. Part of what John said was inaudible.

*Part of* in (27a) applies to a locutionary object, picking out a partial content, and in (27b) to a phatic object, picking out a temporal part of an utterance.

 Locutionary objects are like assertions except that they do not yet come with a commitment to truth, which would allow them to have validity beyond the time of the locutionary act. If commitment to truth is the one characteristic feature of assertions distinguishing from mere sayings, the assertion that *S* will consist in the locutionary object *d* of saying that *S* together with a commitment to maintaining *d*.

 Locutionary objects in the realm of the mental play a role in philosophical accounts of judgment. They roughly correspond, for example, to Brentano’s notion of a presentation, with judgments being viewed as recognitions of the truth of presentations.[[12]](#footnote-12)

 Locutionary acts may be part of illocutionary acts, but they need not be. Certainly, there are locutionary acts that are performed without performing illocutionary acts, say utterances for the purpose of grammatical exercise and entertaining thoughts for mere consideration.[[13]](#footnote-13)

 Locutionary objects may seem on a par with propositions, as they appear to be force-neutral yet are truth-evaluable. However, locutionary objects are concrete objects resulting from acts of saying and thinking, whereas propositions (on the standard view) are abstract objects that are meanings of sentences and play a semantic role in all contexts in which sentences occur.

**1.6. Thin locutionary and illocutionary objects**

Locutionary and illocutionary acts certainly could not have been performed without performing phatic acts. But there is an intuition according to which the same locutionary or illocutionary object could have been produced by performing a different phatic act. For example, John could have said what he said in French or using a different syntactic construction. Moreover, he could have made his assertion not by screaming but by speaking normally. To put it more linguistically, a particular assertion referred to as *that assertion* could have been made in a different language or by using a softer voice, and a request referred to as *that request* could have been made in writing.[[14]](#footnote-14)

 Note also that locutionary and illocutionary objects generally do not share the properties of the phatic object that was produced when performing the locutionary act. While locutionary and illocutionary objects may display properties such as being perceived or being causally efficacious, the properties of locutionary and illocutionary objects consist just in their relatedness to an agent, their satisfaction conditions, and their part structure based on partial content. They do not inherit the form-related properties of phatic objects on which they are based.

 This means that locutionary and illocutionary objects are not dependent for their identity on the particular phatic object on which they are based. This is also reflected in reports of sharing of kinds of locutionary objects with different physical realizations. For example, (28a, b, c) can be true at once:

(28) a. John said the same thing as Mary (that Bill won the race).

 b. John whispered that Bill won the race.

 c. Mary screamed that Bill won the race.

 The same holds for reports of sharing with illocutionary acts. (29) may be true while (28b, c) are true as well:

(29) John asserted the same thing as Mary.

Locutionary and illocutionary objects enter exact similarity relations and form kinds regardless of differences in the phatic objects on which they are based.

 The locutionary and illocutionary objects reported in (28a) and (29) can be called ‘thin locutionary objects’ and ‘thin illocutionary objects’ respectively. They are abstractions, in a sense, from ordinary locutionary or illocutionary product. That is, a thin illocutionary or locutionary object *d1* abstracted from an ordinary locutionary or illocutionary object *d2* will have only those properties of d2 that relate to *d2*’s conditions of satisfaction and force (or direction of fit), but not properties relating to *d2*’s physical realization or the properties of linguistic form that it involves. I will return to the notion of a thin illocutionary object in Chapter 7.

 Thin locutionary objects also play a role as denotations of subject clauses, for example with the predicate *correct*. There is good evidence that subject clauses with predicates like *correct* stand for locutionary objects. *Correct* when applied to subject clauses conveys truth, as in (30a); but *correct* is hardly applicable to propositions with a clear understanding, as seen in (30b):

(30) a. That John is late is correct.

 b. ??? The proposition that John is late is correct.

Moreover, subject clauses with predicates like *correct* generally come with a topic effect, relating to a previously made suggestion or remark.

 On the other hand, as Moulton (2021) observed, predicates of concreteness, such as causal predicates and predicates of perception, cannot be used for nonrestrictive relative clauses modifying a subject clause, as in (31a), as opposed to DPs explicitly referring to locutionary or illocutionary objects, as in (31b):

(31) a. ??? That John is late, which caused consternation and was overheard by many, is

 correct.

 b. The assertion that John is late, which caused consternation and was overheard by

 many, is correct.

This means that the subject clause in (31a) stand for a thin locutionary or illocutionary object, a thin assertion abstracted from an ordinary assertion by ignoring features pertaining to its physical manifestation.

**1.7. Manner of speaking verbs**

Manner of speaking verbs such as *whisper, muster, scream,* and *shout* have locutionary and phatic uses and thus behave just like simple verbs of saying. First, they take *that*-cause complements and thus describe a truth-evaluable object:

(32) a. John whispered / screamed / muttered that he will come.

 b. What John whispered / screamed / muttered is true.

Second, like *say*, manner of speaking verbs do not interrogatives or infinitival clauses representing the content of what would be an imperative:

(33) a. \* John whispered / screamed / muttered what Bill should do.

 b. \* John whispered / screamed / muttered for Bill to leave.

Manner-of-speaking verbs with non-quotational CP-complements thus describe truth-directed, locutionary objects.

 Manner-of-speaking verbs moreover take pure quotes as complements:

(34) a. John whispered / screamed / muttered ‘hey you!’.

 b. John whispered / screamed / muttered ‘I will’.

On both locutionary and phatic uses, manner-of speaking verbs permit replacement of the complement by special quantifiers, including *words*-NPs. Both (35a) and (35b) are valid inferences from (34a) and (34b):

(35) a. John whispered / screamed / muttered something.

 b. John whispered / screamed / muttered a few words.

 Manner-of-speaking verbs involve more complex locutionary objects, though, than the simple verb of saying *say*. Let us call those ‘locutionary objects of manner of speaking’, as opposed to ‘simple locutionary objects’.

 Like simple verbs of saying, verbs of manner of speaking don’t permit reports of sharing with illocutionary verbs:

(36) a. ??? John whispered the same thing that Mary asserted / demanded / asked.

 b. ??? John whispered the same thing that Mary asserted / demanded / asked.

One might take this to indicate that manner of speaking verbs describe the same simple locutionary objects as *say*. But this cannot be right: reports of sharing with a manner of speaking verb and the verb *say* are unacceptable, as seen in (37a-c):

(37) a. ??? John said what Mary whispered.

 b. ??? John said what he screamed.

 c. ??? What John said is what Mary whispered.

This is in contrast to reports of sharing with the same verb of saying such as (38a) or with the same verb of manner of speaking such as (38b):

(38) a. John said what Mary said.

 b. What John whispered is what Mary whispered.

What is shared according to (38a) is the same kind of locutionary object and according to (38b) the same kind of locutionary object of manner of speech.[[15]](#footnote-15)

 What is interesting is that reports of sharing are tolerable with different verbs of manner speaking (in particular with focus on the verbs):

(39) a. ? John screamed what Mary whispered.

 b. ? John shouted what Bill yelled.

The difference between the two sorts of locutionary objects can be traced to the way they ontologically depend on acts. Simple locutionary objects result from acts of conveying a content. By contrast, locutionary objects of manner are results of both acts of conveying a content and the physical act by which the content is conveyed. Given (38), one might say that a kind of locutionary object of manner of speaking in a broader sense is shared in (39a, b) if the two agents produce the very same kind of locutionary object with some manner of speaking or other.[[16]](#footnote-16)

**1.8. *Words*-NPs as complements of verbs of saying**

Both phatic and locutionary verbs of saying, we have seen, permit special quantifiers like *something*, without giving rise to the Substitution Problem. Verbs of saying (including verbs of manner of speaking) permit addition special quantifier of the form of NPs headed by the noun *word(s)*, that is, *words*-NPs. Thus, (40b) is a valid inference from (40a) with phatic verbs of saying, and (41b) is a valid inference from (41a) with locutionary verbs of saying:

(40) a. John said / whispered / screamed ‘hey’.

 b. John said / whispered / screamed just one word / the word ‘hey’.

(41) a. John said / whispered / screamed that he won the game.

 b. John said / whispered / screamed just a few words.

By not giving rise to the Substitution Problem, *words*-NPs differ from ordinary expression-referring DPs, which do give rise to the Substitution Problem when they are complements of verbs of saying:

(42) a. ??? John said a few expressions.

 b. ??? John whispered a sentence.

 c. ??? John screamed a noun.

Plural *words*-NPs do not range over unordered pluralities of (utterances of) words, but rather over meaningfully structured configurations of (utterances of) words. This is well-reflected in German, which shows a distinction between the plural of the special noun word, *Worte*, and the plural of the ordinary noun *Woerter*, the plural of the ordinary noun *Wort*:

(43) a. Hans sagte ein paar Worte.

 ‘John said a few words.’

 b. ??? Hans sagte ein paar Woerter.

 ‘John said a few words.’

Given the Austinian hierarchy, *words*-NPs are best viewed as ranging over ordered pluralities of products of rhetic acts (rhetic objects), that is, utterances of words with a particular meaning or reference. That they range over such concrete entities is supported by the applicability of evaluative and causal predicates to *words*-NPs:

(44) a. John said a few nice / shocking words.

 b. The words John said shocked everyone.

 c. Mary did not like the words Mary whispered.

One may ask whether the ordered pluralities of rhetic objects that *word*-NPs range over are truth-evaluable and thus constitute locutionary objects. Intuitions are not very sharp:

(45) a. ?? John said a few words, which are true.

 b. ?? The words John said are true.

 c. ?? Mary’s words, the words ‘The world will end tomorrow’, are not true.

Certainly, though, they do not constitute illocutionary objects since they fail to have fulfilment conditions

(46) a. ??? The words ’Finish the paper by midnight!’ cannot be complied with.

 b. ??? John fulfilled / broke the words ‘I will help you!’.

Moreover, *words*-NPs are impossible with illocutionary verbs (Grimshaw 2015):

(47) a. ??? John asserted a few words.

 b. ??? John promised the words ‘I am always ready to help’.

 c. ??? John demanded / asked a few words.

Whether or not *words*-NPs can range over entire locutionary objects, what is clear is that verbs of saying themselves can all be used as both phatic and as locutionary verbs, and they have the same kind of semantics on a phatic and on a locutionary reading.

**2. The syntax and semantics of locutionary verbs**

**2.1. The syntax and semantics of simple locutionary *say***

The syntax and semantics of reports of saying can now be spelled out in some greater detail. The semantic analysis of verbs of sayingon a locutionary reading will be almost the same as that of the semantics of attitude reports, except that the clausal complement of locutionary verbs serves to characterize locutionary objects, not illocutionary objects. Complement clauses of illocutionary verbs act semantically as predicates of the described illocutionary objects, specifying their satisfaction conditions. This is given in (48c) for (48a), based on the syntactic analysis of *claim*in terms of an underlying complex predicate of the sort light verb-nominal root in(48b):

(48) a. John claims that Mary is happy.

 b. John make [NP claim [CP that Mary is happy]]]
   c. ∃d(make(John, d) & claim(d) & prop([*that Mary is happy*])(d))

Recall from Chap. 4 and 5 that ‘prop([S])’, a derived meaning of the sentence S, stands for the property of attitudinal objects of sharing their (truthmaker-based) content with the sentence S. More precisely, it stands for the property of attitudinal objects of sharing their satisfiers with S and, if they have violators, sharing their violators with S. Such a sentence meaning is also suited for locutionary objects. Locutionary objects come with truth conditions, which means, in truthmaker-semantic terms, they come with a set of verifiers and a set of falsifiers.

 Locutionary *say* as in (49a) will be derived from underlying complex predicates consisting of the light verb *do* and a nominal root SAID, more precisely the locutionary variant SAIDloc. SAIDloc will then move up to SPEC(VP), as in (49b), so as to be able to incorporate into the verb (or alternatively, it will adjoin to the verb). The interpretation of (49a) is based on the underlying syntactic structure as in (49c):[[17]](#footnote-17)

(49) a. John said that Mary is happy.

 b. John [VP[SPEC(VP) SAIDloc] [V’do [NP ~~SAID~~loc [CP that Mary is happy]]]]

 c. ∃d(do(John, d) & SAIDloc(d) & prop([*that Mary is happy*])(d))

 What determines that the derived meaning of the *that*-clause is applied to a locutionary object is simply the lexical semantics of locutionary verbs, that is, given the complex- predicate analysis, SAIDloc.

 The syntactic analysis of locutionary act reports with special quantifiers will be parallel to that of attitude reports as well. That is, (50a) will have an underlying structure as in (50b), where the light noun *–thing* in *something* will be analysed as a classifier of the nominal root SAIDloc. SAIDloc will then will move up and incorporate into the verb, as in (50c) (via phrasal movement into the specifier position of the VP or by adjoining to the verb). Based on the underlying structure in (50b), (50a) will be interpreted as in (50d):

(50) a. John said something.

 b. John do [QP some [ClP [Cl thing] [NP SAIDloc]]]

 c. John [VP[SPEC(VP) SAIDloc] [V’do [QP some [ClP [[Cl thing] [NP-~~SAID~~loc]]]]]]

 d. ∃d(do(John, d) & thing-SAIDloc(d))

 The underlying syntactic structure of (51a) will be as in (51b), which is interpreted as in (51c), where ‘dd’ is a plural variable ranging over ordered pluralities:

(51) a. John said a few words.

 b. John [VP[SPEC(VP) SAIDloc][V’ do [QP a few [ClP words [NP ~~SAID~~loc]]]]]

 c. FEW dd(do(John, dd) & SAIDloc(dd) & words(dd))

 In addition to agentive *say*, English also has a stative version of *say*:[[18]](#footnote-18)

(52) a. The sign says that access is forbidden.

 b. The thermometer says that it is 30 degrees.

Here *say* applies to material content bearers, artifacts meant to convey a particular message (perhaps under particular conditions). Such content bearers are material products of locutionary acts. Material locutionary objects such as a sign or thermometer (at a space and time) have satisfaction conditions, namely just those of the message they are meant to convey. Being bearers of truthmaking conditions, material locutionary objects then fall under the nominal root SAIDloc as well. This allows for a straightforward semantic analysis of (52a, b). Whereas agentive *say* involves the light verb *do*, stative *say* involves the light verb *be*, which allows the clausal complement to be predicated directly of the subject referent. Thus the structure underlying (52a) is as below:[[19]](#footnote-19)

(53) The sign [VP[SPEC(VP) SAIDloc] [V’ be [NP~~SAID~~loc [that access is forbidden]]]]

It is uncontroversial to assume that *be* makes no semantic contribution except to ensure that the subsequent predicate is predicated of the subject referent at the time of evaluation. This then yields the logical form of (52a) in (54a) or equivalently (54b):

(54) a. λd[SAIDloc(d) & prop([*that* *access is forbidden*])(d)]([*the sign*])

 b. SAIDloc([*the sign*]) & prop([*that* *access is forbidden*])([*the sign*])

Here SAID is simply a predicate that is true of material and non-material locutionary products, entities produced by locutionary acts that came with satisfaction conditions.

**2.2. The syntax and semantics of direct quotes as complements of verbs of saying**

In addition to *that*-clauses locutionary verbs can take direct quotes as complements, which, unlike pure quotes, convey not only a form but also a propositional content:[[20]](#footnote-20)

(55) John said / wrote / thought ‘I will leave’.

Also illocutionary verbs can take direct quotes as complements, of the three sentence types:[[21]](#footnote-21)

(56) a. John told Mary ‘I will come’.

 c. John demanded ‘Give me one more day!’.

 d. John asked ‘Where is the exit?’.

 Direct quotes are complements of the verb and can be replaced by special quantifiers (Munro 1980, Grimshaw 2015):[[22]](#footnote-22)

(57) John said / wrote / thought something, namely ‘I will leave’.

 In (54)-(55), the *that-*clause could be a direct quote or a pure quote. Yet, pure quotation is to be distinguished from direct quotation syntactically and semantically. Pure quotations can be of any linguistic category (or just be linguistic material). They may convey a (phonetic, phonological, morpho-syntactic) form or the conceptual content of individual words. However, pure quotations as complements of verbs of saying are syntactically DPs and as such fill in positions requiring a DP.[[23]](#footnote-23) Direct quotes, by contrast, are CP-complements, though they take the form of main clauses. This difference between sentential direct quotations and pure quotations is particularly manifest in German. A sentence as a pure quotation must appear in the position of DPs, in the middle field, as in (58a) whereas as a direct quotation it must follow the verb, like all CPs, as in (58b):[[24]](#footnote-24)

(58) a. weil Hans endlich ‘Ich liebe dich’ sagen kann

 because John finally ‘I love you’ say can

 ‘because John can finally say ‘I love you’’

 b. weil Hans endlich sagen kann ‘Ich liebe dich’

 because John finally say can ‘I love you’

 ‘because John can finally say ‘I love you’’

Whereas (58a) can report only a linguistic ability (for example, the ability to pronounce a particular sentence), (58b) can report the readiness to express an emotional state (or the ability to admit to one).

 Direct quotes specify both the content of locutionary or illocutionary objects as well as the form of the phatic objects on which the latter are based. In present terms, this means that direct quotes convey at once properties of phatic objects, specifying their form, and properties of locutionary or illocutionary objects, specifying their satisfaction conditions. I will address the question of how quotes can convey properties of form of phatic objects in the next section. For now let us just assume that a quoted sentence S conveys a property of phatic objects F(S).

 I propose that the two properties conveyed by direct quotes serve to define a single more complex meaning of direct quotes as a property of locutionary or illocutionary objects. If F(S) is the property of phatic objects conveyed by a direct quote ‘S’, then the meaning of ‘S’ can be formulated as the following complex property of locutionary or illocutionary objects:

(59) λd[prop([S])(d) & ∃d’(d’’∠ d & F(S)(d’)]

That is, the direct quote ‘S’ expresses the property that holds of an attitudinal object *d* just in case *d* shares its satisfiers and possibly violators with *S* and *d* is based on a phatic object *d’* of which F(S) holds. The logical form of (60a) will then be as in (60b), where [‘S’] is the meaning of the direct quote ‘S’ as given in (59):

(60) a. John said that S.

 b. ∃d(do(John, d) & SAIDloc(d) & [‘S’](d))

Thus attitudinal-objects semantics can be extended also to locutionary or illocutionary act reports with direct quotes once more complex meanings of direct quotes as complements are admitted.

**2.3. The semantics of pure quotes as complements of verbs of saying**

An important question that quotation raises is: in virtue of what kind of compositional semantics are quotes able to act as predicates of phatic objects? I will just make a general suggestion of a compositional semantics of quotes as such predicates. Elaborating it in detail will go far beyond the present project, which is focused on the ontology and semantic role of attitudinal, modal and locutionary objects.

 On the present view, different kinds of pure quotes as complements of verbs of saying are semantically predicates of phatic objects that are products of different kinds of utterance acts:

(61) a. John said ‘shh’.

 b. John said ‘umarina’.

 c. John said ‘Joe loves Sue’.

In (61a) the pure quote will be predicated of the product of a phonetic act, in (61b) of the product of a phonological act (an utterance act with the aim or realizing a particular phonological structure), in (61c) of the product of a morpho-syntactic act (an utterance act with the intention of realizing a particular morpho-syntactic structure), and in (61c) of the product of rhetic acts (collections of utterances with the aim of referring, conveying concepts, or predicating).

 The semantics of quotation faces a considerable challenge of how it can be integrated into a general compositional semantics of sentences, and how different types of quotation (pure, direct, mixed) may be analysed in a unified way. In what follows, I will only present a general idea of how to develop the semantics of quotation so that it can meet those challenges. A detailed formal development will have to await another occasion. The proposed semantics is based a novel syntactic view of quotation, which permits a novel form of compositional semantics.

The central idea regarding the semantics of quotation is that expressions can be interpreted not, or not just, by assigning them their usual semantic value; they can also be interpreted as properties of products of lower-level linguistic acts. This shift in interpretation is not arbitrary or ‘pragmatic’ but rather has a strict syntactic basis. It is based on a lower-level linguistic structure being part of at the syntactic structure that is input to interpretation. I will sketch the idea first for pure quotation and then indicate in the next sections how it can be extended to direct quotation and perhaps mixed quotation.

 The proposal is that pure quotes can be interpreted as properties of phatic objects because pure quotations involve a lower-level linguistic structure as part of the syntactic structure of the sentence that is input to interpretation (L(ogical) F(orm) in the generative tradition). More precisely, a pure quotation may involve several lower-level linguistic structures as part of LF, a syntactic and a phonological structure, say. I will assume that pure quotes form quotational phrases (KPs). The syntactic structure of (61a) will then roughly be as below:

(62) John [SPEC(VP) SAIDphat [V’do [NP ~~SAID~~~~phat~~ [KP[K e] shh ]]]]

Following Giorgi (2016), one may assume that the head K of a quotational phrase reflects a quotational pause.

 The suggestion then is that K is a special category that will act as a sort of coordinator, setting up a kind of coordinate structure involving other syntactic planes in a three-dimensional syntactic structure (Goodall 1987, Moltmann 1992). On standard three-dimensional syntactic theories of coordination, coordination consists in coordinates being syntactically represented on different planes within a three-dimensional syntactic structure, so that ordinary grammar applies to the various different planes representing the different conjuncts or disjuncts. The difference with quotation would be that the lower-level linguistic structures of quotations are represented at other planes precisely in order to escape the application of rules of ordinary grammar. Quotations need not be grammatically correct: they may be part of other languages, and they may involve linguistic structures below the relevant linguistic level of the rest of the sentence. The structures in the other planes will all be interpreted as properties of products of phonetic or phatic acts, and their conjunction (intersection) will make up the semantic value of the entire quotation. Thus, *shh* in (61a) will have a phonetic structure on a plane different from that of the rest of the sentence, and that structure will be interpreted as a property of products of phonetic acts.

**2.4. The semantics of direct quotes as complements of verbs of saying**

The difference between pure and direct quotation, on the present view, consists in the following. A clause that has the status of a pure quotation has only lower-level linguistic structures (including possibly a syntactic structure that is as such not input to semantic interpretation). This means that it does not have a syntactic structure on the same plane as the LF-structure of the sentence. By contrast, a direct quote *also* has a syntactic structure that is input to semantic interpretation, which allows it to express a property of locutionary or illocutionary objects in addition to expressing a property of phatic objects.

 Direct quotation exhibits selectivity. That is, not everything inside the ‘quotation marks’ matters for characterizing the phatic act in question, but only whatever features the speaker intends to matter. This means that direct quotation may involve just partial lower-level linguistic structures, depending on the speaker’s intentions. As with pure quotation, the level of structure(s) that plays a role for characterizing the phatic object depends on the speaker’s intentions.

 On the analysis given earlier, direct quotes express a complex property defined in terms of a property of locutionary or illocutionary objects and a property of phatic objects. The former is based on the ordinary syntactic structure of the complement clause; the latter is based on a lower-level linguistic structure on a different plane.

 The view I have sketched considers quotation a semantic phenomenon based on a particular kind of syntactic structure of quotational sentences. It is compositional because of the way in which sentential meaning is conceived, as a property of attitudinal and phatic objects. The account differs fundamentally from current approaches to quotation, on which the utterance of the quotation (the token) matters for what the quotation contributes to the meaning of the sentence. This holds both for the tradition of Davidson (Davidson, 1968, 1979, Cappelen/Lepore 2007) and for the more recent identity theory of quotation (Washington 1992, Saka 1998). On the present view, the semantic contribution of quotation is based on structure, and the quotational structure is interpreted as a property of phatic objects

 To summarize the idea, both pure and direct quotation involve linguistic structures below the level of Logical Form, structures whose interpretation consists in properties of products of phatic acts of the various sorts. Such properties are just what those structures can be taken stand for, given the grammatical level to which they belong, However, when those structures represent quotation and are part of a three-dimensional syntactic structure, the properties of phatic objects will make up the semantic contributions of pure and direct quotes to the composition of the overall meaning of the sentence.

**2.5. Mixed quotation**

With some further modification this proposal may also extend to mixed quotation, along the following lines. In addition to its normal semantic value, a mixed quotation conveys a property characterizing the product of a phatic act. In a sentence embedded under a verb of saying, this act may be the act described by the embedding verb, as in (63a), or a contextually given phatic act, as in (63b):

(63) a. John said that he ‘resides’ in Paris.

 b. John ‘resides’ in this neighborhood.

In (63a, b) the quotation may characterize part of John’s utterance, specifying John’s choice of words in a statement of where he lives. Like a direct quotation, a sentence containing a mixed quotation has two meanings: its ordinary meaning, a property of locutionary or illocutionary objects, and a property of phatic objects The difference is that with direct quotation the utterance property is expressed by the entire embedded sentence, whereas in the case of mixed quotation, it is expressed by a subsentential part. Moreover, with mixed quotation the utterance property may serve to characterize a contextually given utterance part, rather than the product of the act described by the embedding locutionary verb.

 The syntactic structure involved in mixed quotation will be similar to that of direct quotation: the quoted expression will have an additional, lower-level linguistic structures at a different plane, which will be interpreted ‘literally’ as a property of products of phonetic or phatic acts. Sentences with mixed quotations will have the same sort of compositional semantics as direct quotations, which consists in interpreting an LF-structure containing an additional partial lower-level linguistic structure as a property partially specifying the form of an utterance (a phonetic or phatic product). But with mixed quotation, this property may be predicated of a contextually given utterance. This means that mixed quotation involves a pragmatic element not present with direct quotation.

**3. Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the semantics of attitude reports developed in the previous chapter can be extended rather straightforwardly to verbs of saying and quotation once the ontology of attitudinal objects is expanded so as to include locutionary and phatic objects. This extension naturally goes along with Austin’s hierarchy of speech acts according to which illocutionary acts are performed by performing locutionary acts, which are performed by performing phatic acts, an ordering that matches a corresponding order of illocutionary, locutionary, and phatic objects. Phatic and locutionary objects play the same sort of semantic roles in reports of saying as attitudinal objects in the semantics of (simple) attitude reports.

 The extension of attitudinal-objects semantics was made possible by a novel account of quotations on which quotes can act as predicates of phatic objects (possibly based on a syntactic structure that allows lower-level syntactic structures to be part of the syntactic input to interpretation). The semantic treatment of quotational complements as predicates of objects receives independent support from the possibility of quotation occurring in predicative positions of various sorts.

 The semantics was able to account for the characteristic properties of verbs of saying, on a locutionary and a phatic reading summarized below:

(64) a. Locutionary (uses) of verbs of saying

- take *that*-clauses and direct quotes as complements

- take special quantifiers and *words*-NPs as complements

- describe truth-evaluable, locutionary objects

 b. Phatic (uses of) verbs of saying

- take pure quotes, which are DPs, as complements

- take special quantifiers and *words*-NPs as complements

- describes a phatic, non-truth-evaluable objects

Whereas *that*-clauses, infinitival clauses and *wh*-clauses stand for properties of locutionary or illocutionary objects, pure quotes stand for properties of phatic objects. Direct quotes convey both properties illocutionary and locutionary objects and form-related properties of phatic objects on which the illocutionary or locutionary objects are based.

 A novel compositional semantics of quotation was suggested, on which quotation is based on a lower-level linguistic structure which is part of the syntactic structure that is input to semantic interpretation (Logical Form). This general idea, still to be elaborated in any detail, addresses a major challenge for the semantics of quotation, namely its integration within compositional semantics.

1. The theory of quotation of Ginzburg / Cooper (2014), which is an application of an act-related view of meaning to quotation, shares similarities with the present approach to quotation, for example by making use of ‘locutionary propositions’ for direct quotation. However, its empirical motivations and theoretical framework are rather different, and the present space does not permit a more detailed discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Austin actually gave various not entirely consistent characterizations of the notion of a rhetic act. I will just focus on one of them. See Searle (1968) for further discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This was noted by Searle (1968). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. One may take it to be a kind of part relation. Note, though, that it is not reflected as a part relation in natural language: *part of* when applied to a claim can pick out only a partial content, not a phatic or phonetic object on which the claim is based. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. According to Austin (1962), indirect quotes, that is, *that*-clause complements of verbs of saying, characterize rhetic acts, whereas direct quotes characterize phatic acts (though Austin is not always consistent in what he takes indirect quotes to characterize). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In English, *whisper* behaves more like *utter*, but not so, for example, in German:

(i) ??? Hans fluesterte den Satz ‘Ich komme’.

 ‘John whispered the sentence ‘I am coming’.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. By contrast, the direct object position of *translate* and *pronounce* is not predicational but referential, allowing substitution by an explicit expression-referring term:

(i) Mary translated / pronounced the word ‘red’ as ‘rouge’. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Pure quotations of course have also other syntactic functions than that of a predicate, including other nonreferential roles in close appositions, as below:

(i) a. the morpheme ‘un’

 b. the sentence’ it is raining’

 c. the concept ‘horse’

 d. the phoneme ‘a’

 e. the sound ‘shhh’

The nonreferential status of the quotation is indicated by the impossibility of replacing the quotation by an explicit referential term (\* *the word the word ‘maison’*, *\* the concept what ‘horse’ expresses*).

 Some occurrences of pure quotations may be referential in the sense of involving an implicit close-apposition structure containing an unpronounced sortal noun. This is arguably the case for pure quotations as direct objects of *translate* and *pronounce* and as subjects, as below, where a pure quotation is replaceable by an overt close apposition of a suitable sort:

(ii) a. ‘Mary’ is disyllabic.

 b. The name ‘Mary’ is disyllabic. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The notion of a product of a phatic act in fact matches the familiar notion of a token (as opposed to an utterance act). A token has only relevant properties, properties of the linguistic structure that the act is meant to realize such as phonological, morphological or syntactic features. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. An exception are locutionary verbs whose content involves a performatively used modal, such as (ia), (iia), and (iiia):

(i) a. John said that Mary may leave the room.

 b. ?? What John said is true.

(ii) a. John said that Bill must read the announcement.

 b. ?? What John said is true.

(iii) a. John said / wrote that Mary should leave.

 b. ?? What John said became later true.

The acceptability of such sentences may be traced to the fact that performatively used modal sentences entail the corresponding descriptively used modal sentences. (ia), (iia) and (iiia) may then actually display a descriptive use, though they carry an implicature of a stronger statement. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For some reason truth attributions to thoughts are not very good, despite of what philosophers generally assume:

(i) a. ?? John’s thought that the world is round is true.

 b. ?? What John thought is true. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See Brandl and Textor (2022) for a detailed and more differentiated presentation of Brentano’s views of judgment. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Searle (1968) disputes the existence of such neutral occurrences of embedded sentences, but see Green (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The same intuition applies to the actions (and their products) that are not speech acts. The murder of the king could have been done by throwing a bomb instead of by pulling the trigger. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Locutionary manner-of-speaking objects can also be involved in the semantics of verbs like *laugh* and *cry*, which can take *that*-clauses as adjunct:

(i) a. John laughed that he will be back.

 b. Mary cried that she was in pain.

The verbs *laugh* and *cry* describe phatic objects, but those phatic objects may ground locutionary objects to which the adjunct *that*-clauses then apply. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. One might suggest that manner-of-speaking verbs in sentences like (39a, b) have undergone lexical reanalysis (locutionary verb + adverbial modifier), as suggested in Moltmann (2003a, 2013a) for exceptions to the impossibility of reports of content sharing with different attitude verbs in general. But that would not explain the impossibility of sharing with manner-of-speaking verbs and the simple verb *say*. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Major (2021, Chap. 2), proposes a somewhat similar analysis positing a *say-*phrase headed by the verb *say* which selects the CP as complement. *Say* then moves up, adjoining to the light verb *do.* Major / Torrence (to appear) show that in any languages *say* bears a close connection to complementizers, and in fact may act itself as a complementizer. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. For a thorough discussion of the properties of active and stative *say*, see Major (2021). Not all languages display the two readings of *say*, for example German does not:

(i) ?? Das Zeichen sagt, dass Zutritt verboten ist.

 ‘The sign says that access is forbidden’. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Major posits a rather similar structure for stative *say*, involving *be* and the absence of a voice projection. However, he does not give a semantic analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Direct quotes may be of all three sentence types:

(i) a. John said /write/thought ‘Mary is late’.

 b. John said / wrote / thought ‘leave!’.

 c. John said / wrote / thought ‘what should I do?’.

One might take this to indicate that verbs of saying may describe illocutionary objects after all. However, this cannot be, as we have seen from reports of sharing with locutionary and illocutionary verbs and with the truth-evaluability of clausal complements of locutionary verbs. Rather, more plausibly, the locutionary verbs in (i) take pure quotes as complements. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See Grimshaw (2015), who argues that direct quotes of the three sentence types may satisfy the semantic selectional requirements of illocutionary verbs [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. It is a well-known fact that when taking quotes as complements, verbs of saying allow for parentheticals as in (ia) and quotational inversion as in (ib):

(i) a. ‘I will leave’, John said / wrote / thought.

 b. ‘I will leave’, said / wrote / thought John.

These constructions not available with non-quotational clausal complements: [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Pure quotations are not DPs in all contexts. They may also occur in positions in which no DP-complements may appear, such as in close appositions as in (ia) and following verbs that take no complements at all, as in (ib):

(i) a. the word ‘hello’

 b. John went ‘Hey, hey, hey’. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. For similar syntactic observations about Dutch see de Vries (2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)