ESSLLI 2015

*Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content*

Handout 5

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**Attitudinal Objects and the Semantics of Quotations**

**1. Types of quotation and general approaches**

Pure quotation

(1) a. ‘The’ is a determiner.

 b. Mary said ‘hey’.

 c. Mary translated ‘red’ as ‘rouge’.

Direct quotation:

(1) b. Mary said ‘I will come’.

Mixed quotation

(1) c. Quine says that quotation ‘has a certain anomalous feature’.

 ‘Pragmatic’ phenomena of quotation

Mixed quotation, scare quotes:

(2) a. John embraced ‘that woman’.

 b. John ’resides’ in Paris.

Two general challenges of quotation

- Integration of quotation into syntax

- Integration of quotation into compositional semantics

Approaches to pure quotation

Pure quotations as referential terms, referring to expression types

- as names (Quine, Reinach)

- as descriptions (Geach)

- as complex expressions consisting of quotation marks acting as demonstratives pointing at displayed token within quotation marks (Davidson)

- as names involving quotational use or mentioning, that is, reference to the expression type that is being used (Washington 1992, Saka 1998)

Present project:

Compositional account of quotation, within a novel conception of act-based meaning and the syntactic structure involved in quotation

Pure quotation

Pure quotations do not generally act as referential terms.

Pure quotations convey meanings based on lower-level linguistic acts (in Austin’s 1962 sense), such as phatic acts (phonetic acts, phonological acts), morphological acts), concept-conveying acts, referential acts.

Pure quotations have as their meaning lower-level product types and as such can easily have a predicative function in the sentence.

Extension to direct and mixed quotation straightforward: they express both properties of lowe-level linguistic products and locutionary, illocutionary, or cognitive products

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**2. Complement clauses act as predicates of cognitiveor illocutionary products**

(3) a. John claimed that S

 b. ∃e(claim(e, John) & [*that* S](product(e)))

(4) a. John’s claim that S

 b. ιe[claim(e, John) & [*that* S](e)]

Ways for clausal complements to characterize cognitive products

Range of degrees of fine-grainedness:

Implicit belief (including beliefs of animals and small children)

Clausal complement specifies truth conditions or situations in which the cognitive product is true / satisfied.

*Think, claim*: clausal complement may specify smaller products composing the thought or claim:

Act of reference – referential product

Act of conveying a concept – conceptual product

Act of predication – predicational product

(5) John thinks that Mary is happy.

[*that Mary is happy*] = The property of a cognitive product x such that x consists of a referential product involving the use of ‘Mary’ and a predicational product involving the use of the concept ‘happy’

Ways of specifying cognitive products:

Smaller products – larger products – sets of satisfiers of products

Form-related products – meaning-related products

Nominalizations for form-related products

John’s act of translating ‘red’ as ‘rouge’ -- John’s translation of ‘red as ‘rouge’

John’s act of pronouncing of ‘red’ as ‘ret’ – John’s pronunciation of ‘red’ as ‘ret’

John’s act of naming Mary – Mary’s name (??)

Quotational *as*-phrases, predicated of lower-level products:

(6) a. John translated ‘red’ as ‘rouge’.

 b. John gave a translation of ‘red’ as ‘rouge’.

(7) a. John pronounced ‘red’ as ‘ret’.

 b. John’s pronunciation of ‘red’ as ‘ret’.

Austin’s (1962) distinction between linguistic acts of increasingly higher levels:

phonetic acts (the uttering of sounds) –

phatic acts (the uttering of sounds as belonging to phonological, morphological, or syntactic categories)

rethic acts (utterances for the purpose of conveying conceptual or referential meaning) - locutionary acts (utterances for the purpose of conveying a propositional content) - illocutionary acts (making assertions, demands etc).

Ordinarily, such acts are ordered by the ‘by’-relation

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Quotation

Lower-level linguistic acts are performed not or not just in order to perform higher-level linguistic acts, but rather to convey lower-level product types as part of the meaning of the sentence.

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**3. Products and Quotation**

Clausal complements:

may specify not only content-related properties of the product in question, but also form-related properties.

Quotational complements: convey form-related product types

A simple case

pure quotation as a complement

(8) John said ‘hey’

*Hey*, with its morphological structure within the LF of the sentence and without quotation marks: stands for a morphological product type

Its semantic function is to be predicated of the utterance product:

(9) ∃e(say(e, John) & [*hey*](product(e)))

The compositionality issue

How can quoted material in a sentence stand for a form-related product type?

The new view

Quoted material has lower-level linguistic structure within the syntactic structure that is input to interpretation (LF):

phonological, morphological, or syntactic structure within the LF of the sentence.

Lower-level linguistic structures are interpreted not as meaning-related product types, but as form-related product types.

The syntactic (LF-) structure of (8)

(10) John [said [hey]m ]VP

Consequences

- Pure quotations need not be considered NPs, but can be of lower-level categories, licensed

as such in particular contexts in the syntactic structure of a sentence.

- Pure quotations need not be considered having the semantic function of referential terms.

Other semantic functions of pure quotations:

Predicates (of small clauses), nonreferential complements (of certain verbs)

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**5. Direct quotation**

Example

(11) Mary said ‘I will come’.

Properties of direct quotation:

CP complements of verbs of saying: *say, state, ask, answer, complain, remark*

CP adjuncts (?) of verbs like *smile, laugh*, etc.

Selectivity

(12) Mary said in French ‘I will come’.

Semantic selection

(13) Mary asked ‘Will you come?’

Obligatory indexical shift:

(14) a. ‘I will come’, said Mary.

 b. \* ‘Shei will come’, said Maryi.

The approach:

Direct quotations specify a property of form and a property of content of cognitive or illocutionary products. The property of form is based on a lower-level linguistic structure, possibly a partial structure or mixed structure, such as phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactic (non-LF) structure

Accounting for indexical shift:

Sentence meanings as properties of cognitive products.

Direct quotations have a separate, nonintegrated syntactic structure. Therefore, indexicals in indirect quotation must receive a local interpretation within the structure of the embedded clause which is interpreted as a property of (described) product.

Indirect quotation (*that*-clause complements of verbs of saying): syntactic structure integrated: of the clausal complement is integrated within the overall syntactic structure of the sentence. This means that indexicals receive interpretation within the overall structure of the sentence, not just locally

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**6. Mixed quotation**

(15) John said that he ‘resides’ in Paris.

Again complex structure as input to interpretation:

LF plus partial lower-level linguistic structure, interpreted as a partial form-related specification of cognitive products.

Mixed quotation relating to a different agent in the context:

form-related product type is predicated of contextually given cognitive product.

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**7. Pure quotation**

Pure quotations acting referential terms

Subject position:

(16) a. ‘Mary’ is disyllabic.

 b. The word ‘Mary’ is disyllabic.

(17) a. ‘Maison’ means ‘house’.

 b. The word ‘maison’ means ‘house’.

Pure quotations not acting as referential terms

[1] Close appositions

(18) a. the word ‘house’

 b. the sentence ‘I will come’

 c. the concept ‘horse’

(19) a. \* the word the word ‘maison’

 b. \* the concept what ‘horse expresses’

 c. \* the sentence that sentence

[2] Nonreferential quotational complements

Complements of *mean*

 (20) a. ‘Maison‘ means ‘house’ / the concept ‘house’ / \* the concept of a house / \* the word

 house.

Intensional *mean*:

(20) b. ‘Maison’ means a building in which people can live.

(21) a. ‘Rouge’ means ‘red’ / \* the expression ‘red’ / \* the concept red.

 b. ‘Rot’ means *that* too.

 c. *What* does ‘rouge’ mean?

[3] Predicative quotation: Quotational *as*-phrases

Quotational *as*-phrases as s predicates of small-clause complements of verbs such as *translate* and *pronounce*

 (22) a. John translated ‘red’ as ‘rouge’.

 b. John pronounced ‘red’ as ‘read’.

Nonquotational predicative *as*-phrases:

 (23) a. Mary treated John as a brother.

 b. Mary treated John well (\*as a brother).

*As* selects predicative complements

Quotational *as*-phrases compete with *well*:

(24) a. John translated ‘red’ well (\*as ‘rouge’).

 b. John pronounced ‘red’ well (\* as ‘read’ / ok namely as ‘red’).

‘Rouge’ as a predicate of the object-related product ‘translation of ‘red’’, ‘pronounciation of ‘red’’

Quotational *as-*phrases go along with *how*-pronouns, not *what*-pronouns:

(25) a. How did John translate ‘red’ ?

 b. Bill translated it that way too.

 c. How did John pronounce ‘red’?

 d. Bill pronounced it that way too.

Direct object position of *translate* and *pronounce*:

 not predicational, but referential, allowing substitution by an explicit expression-referring term and allowing for the ‘ordinary’ (non-nominalizing) pronoun *it*:

(26) a. She pronounced / translated the word ‘red’ as ‘rouge’.

 b. She had never pronounced / translated *it* before.

[4] Predicative quotations with verbs of calling

(27) a. John called her ‘Marie’.

 b. \* John called her the name ‘Marie’.

‘Marie’ in (27a) has predicative status (Matushansky 2008)

Matushansky (2008): evidence for the predicativist theory of names:

Names are on a par with common nouns and have a property as their meaning, of the sort λx[x is stands in R to ‘N’], where R is a suitable contextually given naming relation.

Alternative:

Names as small-clause predicates are quoted, quotations can be predicates.

Pure quotations standing for types of products can act as predicates of products.

Further evidence:

In German (French, Italian etc) names as predicates of small-clause complements of verbs of calling go along with pronouns *so / how* and not *that / what*:

(28) a. Hans nannte sie ‘Marie’.

 ‘John called her Marie.’

 b. Jeder nennt sie so / \* das.

 ‘Everyone called her so / that. ‘

 c. Wie / \* Was nannte Bill sie?

 ‘How / What did he call her?’

(29) a. Hans nannte sie einen Esel.

 ‘John called her a donkey. ‘

 b. Bill hat sie das / \* so auch genannt.

 ‘Bill called her that / so too.’

 c. Was / \* Wie nannte er sie?

 ‘What / How did he call her?’

By contrast:

(30) a. Hans nannte sie einen Esel.

 ‘John called her a donkey.’

 b. Das / \* So wuerde ich sie nicht nennen.

 ‘That / So I would not call her.’

 c. Was / \* Wie hat er sie genannt?

 What / How did he call her?

Explanation of the difference between English and German

English chooses nominalizing quantifiers and pronouns *what, that* (Moltmann 2003) in place of predicational quotations, rather than ‘adverbial’ quantifiers and pronouns (*so, how*); German, French, Italian do not.

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