Handout CCCA

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**Presentation of Book ms. *Objects and Attitudes***

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**1. Preliminaries**

1.1. The ontology of attitudinal and modal objects

1.2. Truthmaker semantics for attitudinal and modal objects

TMS:

- Involves not possible worlds, but situations or actions,

- Centers on relation of exact truthmaking:

As a relation to sentences: sentence-based TMS (Kit Fine)

As relation to attitudinal and modal objects: object-based TMS (FM)

Why TMS for attitudinal and modal objects?

Partial content (*part of John’s claim, thought, decision, demand…)*

Actions as satisfiers: permits normative account of direction of fit (correctness of claims – corrections of actions that comply with demands)

1.3. Sentence meanings

Bilateral sentence meanings: <pos(S), neg(S)>

The derived meaning of sentences:

(1) Truthmaker-based meaning ofclauses

For a clause S, prop(S) = λd[pos(d) = pos(S) & (neg(d) ≠ Ø 🡪 neg(d) = neg(S))]

Applicable to attitudinal and modal objects both forces!

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**2. Chapter 5: The Syntax and Semantics of Basic Attitude Reports**

Basic attitude reports: attitude reports with basic attitude verbs, e.g. *believe, claim*

The standard view of the semantics of attitude reports :

The Relational Analysis

(2) a. John believes that S.

b. believe (John, [*that* S])

Problems

- The Substitution Problem (Objectivisation Effect)

- The object-content distinction for attitudes,

- Conceptual problems for abstract propositions

The new approach

Focus on complex attitude reports, which involve explicit reference to attitudinal objects:

(3) a. John claimed that S

b. John made a claim that S.

Languages often display both simple attitude verbs and corresponding complex attitude predicates:

(4) a. believe – have a belief

b. assume - make an assumption

c. intend – have an intention

d. plan – make a plan

e. order – give an order

Semantics of attitudinal-object nominals

(5) [*claim that* S] = λd[claim(d) & prop([*that* S])(d)]

The logical form of complex attitude reports

Force of necessity:

(6) a. John insists that Bill is insane (that Bill *must* be insane)

b. John makes the instance that Bill is insane

c. ∃d(make(John, d) & insistance(d) & prop([*that Bill is insane*])(d))

Force of possibility:

(7) a. John hinted that Bill is insane (that Bill *might* be insane).

b. John made a hint that Bill is insane

c. ∃d(make(John, d) & hint(d) & prop([*that Bill is insane*])(d))

Harmonic modals:

(8) a. that Bill must be insane

b. λd[must(d) & prop([*Bill be insane*])(d)]

(9) a. that Bill might be insane

b. λd[may(d) & prop([*Bill be insane*])(d)]

Additions

1. Backgrounds

= the modal base of attitudinal objects (Chap. 4)

(10) a. Mary claimed that Bill repeated the exam.

b. Joe must pay a fine for speeding.

More complex conditions on applying sentence meanings to an attitudinal object d that comes with a background d’, simplifying, a pair <d, d’>:

(11) For a complex attitudinal object <d, d’> with a (simple) attitudinal object d and

a background d’,

for a sentence S with presupposition S’, prop(S)(<d, d’>) = true iff prop(S)(d) and

prop(S’)(d’) and prop(S)(<d, d’>) = false iff prop(S)(d) = false and prop(S’)(d’) = true.

2. Modes of presentation

For *John believes that* S, there will be a relation Cu(S), determined by the intentions of the speaker when uttering S (u(S)), which relates the background d’ of John’s belief d to what d is about, fus(pos(d) ∪ neg(d)) (Cu(S)(d, fus(pos(S) ∪ neg(d)))). That is, if Cu(S)(d, fus(pos(S) ∪ neg(d))) obtains, then the speaker of u(S) associates components or features of d’ with individuals that are part of fusion(pos(d) ∪ neg(d)):

(12) ∃d(have(John, d) & belief(d) & Cu(S)(d, fus(pos(d) ∪ neg(d))) & [that S](d))

Syntactic derivation of simple attitude reports (following, simplified, Arsijenevic 2009)

(13) a. John made a claim that S.

b. John claims that S.

(14) a. John make [DP that [FP [NPclaim] [F’[F +assert] [CPS]]]]

b. John [SPEC(VP) [claimi] [vmake [DP[ei] [CP that [FP ei [+assert] S]]]]]

(15) Reportedly, John left the competition. (Arsijenevic’ motivation for claim in SPEC(FP))

(16) [+assert] = λABλd[A = pos(d) & (neg(d) ≠ Ø 🡪 neg(d) = B)]

(17) a. [that claim [+assert] S] = λd[claim(d) & [+assert](<pos(S), neg(S)>)(d)]

b. ∃d(make(John, d) & [that [claim [+assert] S]](d))

Alternative Harves / Kayne (2012)

(18) a. John needs [to go].

b. John [Nneed] – have [NP ~~need~~ [DPto go]]

(19) a. John make [[NPclaim] [CP that S]]

b. John [SPEC(VP) [NPclaim] [V’ make [NPe] [that S]]

Potential general difficulty

All attitude verbs will have to be composed, sometimes by using abstract nouns (*think, propose*, …)

But: the content of ‘claim’ is in fact ‘make a claim’ etc.

Alternative (Moulton 2009, 2015)

(20) a. John claims ei [that S]i.

b. ∃d(claim(John, d) & [*that* S](d))

But differences with respect to factive verbs and other verbs taking ‘referential’ CPs.

Special quantifiers

(21) a. John claims something / nothing / a few things / a lot.

b. John claims that.

c. John claims what Mary claims.

d. ??? John claims some proposition / some entity / some thing / some content.

(22) a. John thinks that Mary is happy.

John thinks something.

b. Mary believes everything Bill believes.

Bill believes that it is raining.

Mary believes that it is raining.

Restrictions of special quantifiers

(23) a. John said something nice (namely that S).

b. John thought something daring (namely that S).

c. John said something that made Mary very upset.

Constraints on reports of the sharing of the content of different attitudes

(24) a. John believes what Mary believes that Bill was elected president.

b. ?? John screamed what Mary believes, namely that Bill was elected president.

c.?? John expects what Mary believes, namely that Sue will study harder.

d. ?? John assumes what Mary expects, namely that it will rain.

Correlations:

(25) a. ?? John’s scream was / was the same as Mary’s belief.

b. ?? John’s expectation is / is the same as Mary’s belief.

c. ?? John’s claim was / was the same as Mary’s expectation

Special quantifiers involving the light noun THING

Light nouns as classifiers:

(26) a. John claimed two things.

b. John ate two things, beans and bread / the beans and the bread.

Special quantifiers with attitude verbs

The light noun *thing* acts as a classifier selecting an NP headed by *claim*:

(27) a. John make [DP some [ClassP thing [NP claim]]]

By phrasal movement, the NP *claim* subsequently moves into the specifier position of the VP (= adjunction):

(27) b. John [SPEC(VP) [NP claim]i [V’ make [DP some [ClassP thing [NP ei]]

Analysis of reports of sharing:

Additional assumptions:

1. *Thing* is polysemous: maps the content of an attitudinal noun like *claim* onto

- a property of individual claims (THING1)

- a property of kinds of claims (THING2).

2. Free relatives: wh-phrase as head of the DP (Bresnan and Grimshaw (1978) and subsequent literature):

(28) a. John claimed what Mary claimed.

b. John made [DPwhat [ClassPTHING2 claim] [Mary made what [THING2 claim]]]

c. John [SPEC(VP) claim [V’ made [DP what [ClassP THING2 ~~claim~~]] [Mary [SPEC(VP) claim

[V’ made [ClassP THING2 ~~claim~~]]]]]]]

(29) [what [THING2 claim] [Mary made [ClassP~~THING~~~~2~~ ~~claim~~]] ] =

max d[[THING2 claim](d) & make(Mary, d)]

More difficult data about special quantifiers (W. Davis 2021)

Predicates of fulfillment:

(30) Joe fulfilled what he promised

But:

(31) a. Joe kept his promise.

b. Joe broke his promise.

(32) a. ??? Joe kept what he promised.

b. ??? Joe broke what he promised

(33) a. John acquired his belief long time ago.

b. ??? John acquired what he believes long time ago.

Older data on my part (Moltmann 2014):

Difficult with special quantifiers as complements of copula verbs ranging over tropes:

(34) a. John is something admirable, courageous.

b. Courage is admirable.

(35) a. John’s courage is greater than Mary’s / exceeds Mary’s.

b. ??? What John is is greater than what Mary is / exceeds what Mary is.

Potential solution of the problem

Keep, break, acquire, is greater than, exceed become light verbs when applied to attitudinal objects and tropes, light verbs cannot combine with light DPs

(36) a. John made Mary lough.

b. ??? John made something

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**3. Chapter 6: Verbs of saying**

General idea

Same semantics, with an extension of the domain of attitudinal and modal objects to an ontology of locutionary and phatic objects

Verbs of saying

*say, write, whisper, scream, repeat, praise*, and *think*, a locutionary verb in the realm of the mental.

Verbs of saying take *that*-clauses as complements as in (36a), as well as pure quotes as in (36b) and direct quotes, as (36c);

(36) a. John said that

b. John said ‘shh’;

c. John said ‘I will come’.

Substitution problem, but not with special quantifiers and *words*-NPs:

(37) a. \* John said a proposition / a content / a sentence / a verb.

b. John said something.

c. John said a few words.

Locutionary objects

Are truthbearers, but not bearers of fulfilment conditions

Have weak assertive force (constatives)

(38) What John said / whispered / screamed is true.

(39) a. What John said / wrote is partly true.

b. ??? What John said / wrote cannot be fulfilled.

(40) a. What John promised cannot be fulfilled.

b. ??? What John said cannot be fulfilled.

Distinction between illocutionary and locutionary objects

(41) a. ??? John asserted what Mary said.

b. John asserted that Bill won the race.

c. Mary said that Bill won the race.

(42) a. ??? John said what Mary demanded.

b. John demanded that Bill should leave.

c. Mary said that Bill should leave.

(43) a. ??? John said what Mary asked

b. John said ‘Did Bill win?’.

c. Mary asked ‘Did Bill win?’.

(44) a. ??? John promised what he said.

b. John promised that he would help Mary.

c. John said that he would help Mary.

(45) a. ?? Mary asserted what John said, that Bill won the race.

b. ?? Mary claimed what Bill whispered, that Bill is the winner.

The distinction between locutionary and illocutionary objects is also reflected in the necessary falsity of identity statements with nouns:

(46) a. ??? John’s utterance is his claim.

b. ??? Mary’s scream is her assertion.

The distinction also holds for mental objects that correspond to the locutionary and illocutionary distinction:

(47) a. ??? John thought what Bill decided.

b. Bill decided that they should leave the house / ‘let’s leave the house!’. .

c. John thought that they should leave the house / ‘let’s leave the house!’. .

(48) ??? Bill thought what Mary hoped / believed / desired, that the house would be sold.

Phatic objects

Described by verbs of saying when taking pure quotes as complements

Verbs of saying on a locutionary use

(49) a. John said that Mary is happy.

b. John do saidloc [that Mary is happy]

c. ∃d(do(John, d) & said(d) & [*that Mary is happy*](d))

Verbs of saying on a phatic use

(50) a. John said ‘great’.

b. John do saidphat [great].

c. ∃d(do(John, d) & said(d) & [*great*](d))

The Substitution Problem

Locutionary *say*:

(51) a. Mary said that Bill could help.

b. ??? John said that proposition / entity / utterance / suggestion as well.

Phatic *say*:

(52) a. John said ‘come’.

b. ??? Mary said that expression / that sentence / the verb ‘come’ / that utterance.

*Utter*: ordinary transitive verb that takes expressions as arguments:

(53) a. John uttered that expression / that sentence.

b. ??? John uttered what Mary said, ‘Ich liebe dich’.

Pure quotation complements may also act as predicates of conceptual objects, products of rhetic, concept-conveying acts

(54) a. By ‘dislike’ John meant ‘hate’.

b. ‘Red’ means ‘red’.

On both uses *mean* disallows substitution of the complement by an explicit concept-referring term, but allows substitution by special quantifiers:

(55) a. ??? By ‘dislike’ John meant the meaning of ‘hate’.

b. ??? ‘Red’ means the concept red.

c. ‘Red’ means something.

(56) a. ‘Rouge’ means ‘red’.

b. Rouge’ have [meaning ‘red’]

c. ∃d(have(‘rouge’, d) & meaning(d) & [*‘red’*](d))

Pure quotations as predicates

(57) a. Mary translated red as ‘rouge’.

b. Sue pronounced ‘red’ as ‘rett’.

(58) a. the translation of ‘red’ as ‘rouge’

b. the pronounciation of ‘red’ as ‘rett’

Syntax and semantics of locutionary s*ay*

Arsijenevic’ style analysis:

(59) a. John said that Mary is happy.

b. John [VP[SPEC(VP) said [V’do [DP ~~said~~ ] [CP [SPEC(CP) ~~said~~] [that]C [[SPEC(FP) ~~said~~ [F +SAY]

[CP he is happy]]]]

(60) ∃d(do(John, d) & said(d) & prop([*that Mary is happy*])(d))

(61) a. John said something.

b. John [[said] SPEC(VP) [V’do [DPsome [ClP [thing]Cl [NP-~~said~~]]ClP]DP]]VP

*Words*-NPs as special quantifiers

(62) a. John said a few words.

b. John [SPEC(VP) said [V’do [NP a few words ~~said~~]]]

c. FEW dd (do(John, dd) & said(dd) & words(dd))

‘dd’ is a plural variable ranging over ordered pluralities:

Stative *say*

(63) a. The sign says that access is forbidden.

b. The thermometer says that it is 30 degrees.

(53) The sign [SPEC(VP) said [V’ be [that [SPEC(FP) ~~say~~ [ F] [access is forbidden]]]]]]

Unproblematic assumptions:

1. *Be* makes no semantic contribution except to ensure that the subsequent predicate is predicated of the subject referent at the time of evaluation.

2. The noun said applies to locutionary products of any sort, including material locutionary products (signs, books, letters etc).

(54) a. λd[said(d) & prop([*that* S])(d)] ([*the sign*])

b. said([*the sign*]) & prop([*that* S])([*the sign*])