**Preface**

This book pursues a project that in a way had started twenty years ago when in I argued that the linguistic facts do not support propositions as the entities that propositional attitudes are about, but attitudinal objects, the things attitudinal nouns like *claim* and thought describe and that have rather different properties from propositions, apart being truth bearers (Moltmann 2003a, b, 2004). Thanks to my former colleagues at the IHPST in Paris, Jaques Dubucs and Wioletta Miskiewicz, I became aware that a closely related notion to that of a product plays a central role in Twardowski’s philosophy (Twardowski 1911, Dubucs / Miskiewicz 2012). This became a major inspiration and encouragement to pursue the approach further. The interest in Twardowski’s view as well as in related cognitive approaches to propositions in the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy of language led to the edited volume Moltmann and Textor (2017).

The present project involves two major deviations from my earlier work. The first concerns the semantics of attitude reports. In Moltmann (2003a, b, 2004, 2013), I had pursued a multiple relations analysis of attitude reports on which attitudinal objects such as John’s belief that Mary is happy were construed as relational qua objects, the propositional constituents Mary and happiness qua being related in the belief-way to John. This particular view was subsequently given up, in part because it has similar problems to a structured propositions view of propositions, in part because some of the specific linguist support for it turned out to be in error. From 2014 onwards I switched to a view on which *that*-clauses act as predicates of attitudinal objects (Moltmann 2014). This view plays a central role in this book as well.

The second deviation from the earlier work is the recognition of a category of modal objects. Modal objects were not recognized by Twardowski and in fact they do not fit Twardowski’s understanding of a product, namely as an aspect of an act. They fit much a better a view on which at least some attitudinal and modal objects are abstract artifacts. The notion of a modal object can also be taken to subsume the notions of a fact and of a state of affairs. Further deviating from the Twadowskian view, I now also acknowledge the possibility of reference to thin generic assertions with *that-*clauses.

In this project as in earlier work (Moltmann 2014, 2017, 2020), I combine the ontology of attitudinal and modal objects with truthmaker semantics as recently developed by Fine (217, 2018a, b, 220a, b). This is not an arbitrary choice; rather the ontology of attitudinal and modal objects provides specific new motivations for truthmaker semantics.