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**Actual clauses in Lubukusu and what they mean for a symmetric theory of clausal complementation**

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**The Standard view of clausal selection: *Predicates select the kinds of clauses that they can take as complements,*** that is, that ***the selection relation between predicates and their clausal complements is asymmetric.***

**Today’s Thesis**:

***Clausal complement election is a symmetric compatibility relation***.

There are instances where one might almost as easily say that clauses select the predicates they are compatible with.

I offer two case studies where clause types select predicates they are compatible with: the English inherent subjunctive and the Lubukusu actual clause, with emphasis on the latter.

**1.0 English Inherent Subjunctive**

 The English inherent subjunctive (EIS) is always a complement clause and it always has a deontic meaning, evoking an obligation that some event or state of affairs come about.

 1a) John requires that Lyla leave

 b) \*Lyla leave./\*That Lyla leave.

 c) \*Warren will insure/decree that Lyla leave.

 d) Warren will insure/decree that Lyla must leave.

Verbs that take EIS complements imply that what should come about is not in the power of the matrix clause subject, as, for example, is the case for *advise, demand, desire, insist, ask, beg, petition prefer, propose, recommend, request, suggest,* and *urge*, but if the matrix subject is the sufficient source to bring about the event or state of affairs, EIS is not possible, as the contrast between (1c) and 1d) shows.

The same generalization holds for adjectives that take EIS, such as *adamant* and *insistent*, as well as those that take an expletive subject including *advisable, all right, appropriate, best, better, compulsory, crucial, desirable, essential, expedient, fitting, imperative, important, legitimate, mandatory, necessary, optional, okay, permissible, preferable, right, satisfactory, sufficient, urgent,* and *vital* and these contrast with adjectives like *likely, possible, obvious* and so forth that do not evoke a party interested in the outcome.

 2a) It is necessary that you be there

 b) It is necessary that the atomic weight of hydrogen be 1.

 c)\*It is likely that you be there.

It is difficult to get a reading of (2b) along the lines that there could be no other outcome on account of natural law (unless the whole sentence is the consequent of a conditional).

A difference between EIS and the periphrastic subjunctive is illustrated by the contrast in (3).

 3a) The lawyers insist that Lyla leave.

 b) The lawyers insist that Lyla must leave.

The difference is subtle, but (3b) can be taken to be advice, as in a situation where Lyla is involved in a scandal and the lawyers in the office of risk management are making a recommendation to the CEO, but (3a) is not understood as advice, but as a requirement.

**EIS as a selector of predicates**

1. Because EIS is always deontic:

EIS selects predicates that require an unrealized event or state of affairs that serves the interest of an implicit or explicit party who cannot bring about the event or state of affairs on their own. – This might be thought of as the harmonic requirement.

1. Predicates that fit this description vary considerably.

 Some have overt subjects and potential direct objects (*ask*),

 Some have subjects and potential prepositional objects (*suggest to someone, demand of*

 *someone*),

 Some have no overt (prepositional) object (*prefer*), while

 Some adjectives have subjects that are the interested parties (*adamant*) and othershave

 expletive subjects (*crucial, necessary*)

1. ***Since the predicates vary and EIS is constant, why isn’t EIS the selector of the predicates it co-occurs with?***

Digression – Kratzer (2014) would see this as a form of ‘harmony’ that matches the modality of the clause with the modality imposed on an event or state described by a verb. More perhaps later.

**Compare English infinitives**

English infinitives vary in their distribution and interpretation in a way that seems attributable to the predicates that take them.

 4a) Wilson plans to read the book.

 b) Barry believes John to be guilty/to have read the book/??to read the book

 c) Sally started to (\*have) read the book

 d) Yorgas is upset to have been selected.

While (4a) implies that the event described by the infinitive is in the future relative to the planning, (4b) permits simultaneity with the matrix event, or it could be prior, but it cannot be a future event. By contrast, (4c) requires simultaneity between the start and the reading, while in (4d) the infinitival event could be prior to the matrix event (e.g., if Yorgas learns only later that he has been selected), yet of the four sentences, only (4d) is factive, just as the complement to *upset* is factive even if it is an indicative. ***Infinitive varies according to selection by predicate?***

**However**,consider the following effect, which I call ‘***directive shift***’:

 5a) Sturges told Blain that the earth is flat.

 b) Sturges persuaded Blain that the earth is flat

 c) Sturges said/yelled (to Blain) that the earth is flat.

 6a) Sturges told Blain to read the book

 b) Sturges persuaded Blain to read the book

 c) Sturges said/yelled (to Blain) to read the book.

The infinitival complement to these communication verbs (and many others) turns reports of propositions into reports of directed action.

***Thus even infinitives influence what the predicate that selects them can mean.***

Unlike EIS, ***English infinitives are much less rigid in what they can mean, so more compatibility conditions seem to be imposed by predicates than by the infinitive.***

Recent work by Wurmbrand suggests that there are types of infinitive complements that contribute semantic content that is only compatible with certain kinds of predicates.

**2.0 Lubukusu Actual Clauses**

 The inventory of clause types in Lubukusu is partially similar from English in that it has, indicative, infinitive and subjunctive clause types, though the Lubukusu subjunctive does not have to be deontic.

However, Lubukusu also has ***actual clauses*** as described byBaker, Safir and Sikuku (2012) which though they cannot be matrix clauses, are posited as true in the utterer’s world, that is, they have an inherent ***actuality entailment*** (see Bhatt, 1999, and Hacquard, 2006).

 A typical example of an actual clause is (7a)

 7a) Wekesa á-a-bólel-a Wafula a-a-cha

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-tell-fv Wafula SM.c1-ACT-go-fv

 ‘Waekesa told Wafula to go (and Wafula did go)

 b)\*Wekesa á-a-bólel-a Wafula a-a-cha ne kakhali Wafula

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-tell-fv Wafula SM.c1-ACT-go-fv and though Wafula

 sé á-a-ch-á tá

 NEG SM.c1-PST-go-fv not

 ‘Wekesa told Wafula to go (and Wafula did go), but Wafula did not go.’

As the English continuation suggests, actual clause interpretation requires that what x wants has come to pass according to the utterer of the sentence (UTT). If the proposition denoted by the actual clause (the actual clause proposition) is then denied, the speaker is self-contradictory and (7b) is unacceptable.

***Actual clauses also have an aspectual existence entailment -*** The proposition that the actual clause complement denotes is not only true in the world of UTT, but that that the event must be complete, in progress, or report a state that is in effect or completed at the time of utterance and it must be a positive event – an actual clause cannot be negated. (Tones missing)

 8)\*Wekesa ásubila ali Wafula se aalya eng'eni tá

 Wekesa á-a-subil-a a-li NEG a-a-ly-a e-ng’eni NOT

 Wekesa believes AGR.c1-that Wafula not SM.c1-ACT-eat-fv (a) fish

 ‘Wekesa believes that Wafula did not eat a fish (and he did not).’

Similarly, putting the matrix verb in a future tense is also incompatible with an actual clause complement, since in that case the event cannot have taken place at the moment of UTT’s utterance. As the contrasting (b) sentences show, *khu*-infinitives (about which, more later), are all acceptable when the same predicates bear a future tense.

 9a)\*Wafula á-khá-eny-e a-a-bey-a Maria

 Wafula SM.c1-FUT2-want-fv SM.c1-ACT-marry Mary

 ‘Wafula will want ACT-marry Mary.’

 b) Wafula á-khá-eny-e khu-bey-a Maria

 Wafula SM.c1-FUT2-want-fv c15-marry Mary

 ‘Wafula will want to marry Mary.’

 10a) \*Wafula á-khá-khak-e a-a-ly-a e-ng’eni

 Wafula SM.c1-FUT2-try-fv SM.c1-ACT-eat c9-fish

 ‘Wafula will try ACT-eat the fish.’

 b) Wafula á-khá-khak-e khu-ly-a e-ng’eni

 Wafula SM.c1-FUT2-try-fv c15-eat c9-fish

 ‘Wafula will try to eat the fish.’

 11a)\*Wafula á-khá-pang-e a-a-ly-a e-ng’eni

 Wafula SM.c1-FUT2-plan-fv SM.c1-ACT-eat c9-fish

 ‘Wafula will plan ACT-eat the fish.’

 b) Wafula á-khá-pang-e khu-ly-a e-ng’eni

 Wafula SM.c1-FUT2-try-fv c15-eat c9-fish

 ‘Wafula will plan to eat the fish.’

**Actual Morphology.** The actual prefix is realized in the Lubukusu morphological template in the same position where tense normally appears, that is, right after the subject marker, as illustrated by the position of PAST1 (earlier the same day) as in (12). The paradigm of affixes that can occur in that morphological slot (and are in complementary distribution) are listed in (13).

 12) Template for verbs: SM-TNS-OM-ROOT-Extensions- (SBJV)-fv.

 13) Non-future tense and modality expression on Lubukusu verbs

SM.c1-TNS-eat SM.c9-TNS-eat

Simple past: álya yálya SM-a-Verb-a

Today past: àliile, eliile SM-Verb-il-e

Recent past: áalííle, yálííle SM-a-Verb-il-e

Perfective: áàlya, yáàlyà SM-à-Verb-a

Actual: aalya, yaalya SM-a-Verb-a

Subjunctive: ályé, élyé SM-Verb-e

Infinitive: khulya khulya c15-Verb-a

What distinguishes actual morphology from the other pasts and perfect is that vowel [a] is both long and low.

The two assumptions that have been made about what actual clauses entail for the propositions they denote (actual clause propositions) are as follows, roughly stated.

 14a) The actual clause proposition is must be true in the world of UTT.

 b) The event or state of affairs denoted by the actual clause proposition must be complete or

 in progress at the moment of speech by UTT.

**2.1 Actuality Entailment – What is distinctive about Lubukusu**

 The semantic facts discussed so far are reminiscent of what Bhatt (1999) and Hacquard (2006) call an ‘actuality entailment’. Hacquard (2006) has described this effect for examples in French when past perfect is applied to the verbs *pouvoir* and *devoir*.

 15a) Pour aller au zoo, Jane pouvait prendre le train.

 To go to the zoo, Jane can-past-IMPV take the train

 b) Pour aller au zoo, Jane a pu prendre le train.

 To go to the zoo, Jane can-past-PFV take the train

As Hacquard puts it, “The truth conditions of [(15a)] are equivalent to its English translation: there is a world among all accessible worlds in which Jane goes to the zoo where she took the train to get there. This is compatible with a scenario in which Jane did not take the train in reality (nor went to the zoo, for that matter). Things are different with [(15b)]: for the sentence to be true, Jane must have taken the train in the actual world. **Any continuation stating that she, in fact, did not take the train, will come out as a contradiction.**”

Further particulars of the French construction that induces an actuality entailment do not match the Lubukusu actual clauses, however.

* The French effect arises from an interaction between specific verbs and past perfective.
* Lubukusu, by contrast, actual clauses inherently have an actuality entailment no matter what predicates they are complements of.
* The morphology of actual clauses is the exponent that induces the interpretation, not any other combination of affixes or aspects.
* the French effect can hold in matrix clauses, and Lubukusu actual clauses cannot be matrix clauses.

 16)\*Wafula aalya kamatoore

 Wafula a-a-li-a ka-ma-toore

 Wafula SM.c1-ACT-eat-fv c6-c6-banana

 ‘Wafula ate the bananas.’

**2.2 Selection of predicates by actual clauses**

However, not every predicate can take an actual clause complement. For example, the predicates in (18) are among those that permit actual clause complements and the predicates in (19) are among those that do not permit them.

 17) Wekesa á-eny-a/á-a-pang-a/á-a-khak-a a-a-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1.PST-want/plan/try SM.c1-ACT-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa wanted/planned/tried to go home, and he did.’

 18a) \*Maria á-isindukh-a bali a-a-khil-a ku-mu-inyawe

 Mary SM.c1.PST-surprise-fv that SM.c1-ACT-win c3-c3-game

 ‘Mary was surprised that she ACT-won the game’

 b) \*Wekesa á-a-khílw-a/á-a-lób-a a-a-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-fail-fv/refuse SM.c1-ACT-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa failed/refused to go home.’

***Thesis:*** Actual clauses select the class of predicates they are compatible with by virtue of what actual clauses mean.

**What actual clauses mean and how they function in discourse – a partial proposal**

* UTT is committed to the truth of the actual clause proposition they describe, but UTT does not presuppose that the addressee takes the actual clause proposition to be true.
* In this respect, actual clauses are essentially assertions made by UTT.

***The incompatibility of actual clauses with factive predicates is predicted.***

Factive predicates (in addition to (18a)) are not acceptable with actual clause complements.

 19a)\*Maria á-isony-a bali a-a-khil-a ku-mu-inyawe

 Mary SM.c1.PST-regret-fv that SM.c1-ACT-win c3-c3-game

 ‘Mary regretted that she ACT-won the game.’

 b) \*Maria á-a-sangal-a bali a-a-khil-a ku-mu-inyawe

 Mary SM.c1.PST-happy-fv that SM.c1-ACT-win c3-c3-game

 ‘Mary was happy that she ACT-won the game.’

We know -*isoni-, -sangal-,*and *isindukh* are factive because the presupposition of truth survives negation of the matrix predicate, as in (20b) where the complement is an indicative clause.

 20a) Alice á-isóny-a bali Wekesa á-a-béy-a Maria

 Alice SM.c1-regret-fv that Wekesa SM.c1-PST-marry-fv Maria

 ‘Alice does not regret that Wekesa married Mary.’

 b) Alice sé á-isóny-a bali Wekesa á-a-béy-a Maria tá

 Alice NEG SM.c1-regret-fv that Wekesa SM.c1-PST-marry-fv Maria not

 ‘Alice does not regret that Wekesa married Mary.’

For both (20a) and (20b) the speaker presupposes that Wekesa married Mary and that both the addressee shares this presupposition, and that the reported experiencer takes it to be true. Thus factive complements, unlike actual clauses, are incompatible with assertions.

***In this sense, actual clause complements could be said to select for non-factive predicates*** such as *bol-* ‘tell’, *subil-* ‘believe’, *khalak* ‘decide’, *eny-* ‘want’, *khak-* ‘try’ , *reb-* ‘request’, *ulil-* ‘hear’, and *pang-* ‘plan’.

As illustrated in (21a,b), *-subil-*, ‘believe’, does not commit UTT to the truth of the complement proposition whether it is negated or not, but even if *subil* takes an actual complement and is negated, as in (21b), the result is acceptable.

 21a) Alice sé á-subil-a a-li Wekesa á-a-béy-a Maria tá

 Alice NEG SM.c1-believe-fv c1-that Wekesa SM.c1-PST- marry-fv Maria not

 ‘Alice does not believe that Wekesa married Mary.’

 b) Wekesa se-a-subil-a a-li Wafula a-a-siim-a e-ng'eni ta

 Wekesa Neg-SM.c1-believe-fv c1-that Wafula SM.c1-ACT-like-fv c9-fish not

 ‘Wekesa does not believe that Wafula likes fish – in fact, Wafula does like fish.

In (21b) the actual clause is acceptable in the in the scope of matrix negation with –*subil-* because the event is only evaluated for non-future existence in the world of UTT, where Wekesa may have a false belief about Wafula.

***What seems to matter in the broader range of cases is that actual clauses are only compatible with predicates that do not presuppose the truth of their complement propositions.***

This is consistent with the assertive force of the actual and the fact that is a subordinate clause, that is, ***a proposition that is treated as possibly true is in fact true.***

If matrix indicatives are unmarked assertions, perhaps that is why actual clauses, are not possible matrix clauses. It could be that actual clause morphology is thus redundant, and so cannot be used where the unmarked strategy is available.

***The same sort of redundancy argument predicts why actual clauses, unlike indicatives, cannot take AGR-li complementizers.***

The contrast between *bali* and AGR-*li* has carries with it an evaluative effect, in that a proposition of a clause introduced by AGR-*li* is taken by UTT (and/or the matrix subject) to be likely true, whereas one that takes *bali* carries no commitment on the part of UTT and/or the matrix subject that the complement proposition is true, and a potential inference where both forms are available that it is doubtful. This is illustrated in (22) from Diercks (2013:295) (with his glossing and where \_\_\_ is the position where either *bali* or *ali* could occur).

 22) Mosesi a-ul-ile \_\_\_ Sammy k-eba chi-rupia

 1Moses 1S-hear-PST COMP 1Sammy 1S-stole 10-money

 ‘Moses heard that Sammy stole the money.’

 a) If Moses does believe it: bali/ali

 b) If Moses doesn’t believe it, or if the speaker doubts it: bali/\*ali

Diercks notes that factive predicates never occur with AGR-*li* and relates this to the fact that they are presupposed. Actual clauses often occur without an overt complementizer, but they can appear with *bali* and never with AGR-*li*.

 23) Wafula á-a-nyál-a bali/\*a-li a-a-ch-a e-Harvard.

 Wafula SM.c1-PST-able-fv that/c1-that SM.c1-ACT-go-fv c23-Harvard

 ‘Wafula managed to go to Harvard.’

Since an assertion carries the presupposition that UTT is committed to the truth of the proposition, an actual clause complement is considered by UTT to be just likely to be true, but it is actually true. The AGR-*li* complementizer is consistent with this, but both weaker and redundant, and so it cannot be used.

* When *bali* is used it cancels the actuality entailment by distancing UTT from a commitment to the truth of the complement.

**The contribution of the predicate that takes an actual clause**

Whether or not the redundant assertion analysis is the correct way to insure that actual clauses are always embedded, the fact that they are always embedded has consequences for their interpretation. It is always the case that the actual world in which the actual clause proposition is true must also be a world that is shaped by the predicate it is a complement of. ***The predicate may not select for the actual clause, but it has a role in determining what they mean where they are embedded.***

**The aspectual restriction also plays a role in the predicates that actual clauses select**

The actual clause proposition must be true is that the actual clause complement must report an event that is complete at the time of utterance or must be a state of affairs that holds at the time of utterance.

**Prediction:** ***Any predicate that is incompatible with the possibility of its complement proposition being realized will not permit an actual clause.***

Thus verbs like *–khilw-*, *-lob-* and *–khingilil-*, meaning ‘fail’, ‘refuse’, and ‘prevent’, respectively, which imply that the complement proposition is not a realized event or state, do not permit actual clause complements, though they are fully compatible with infinitives.

 24a) Wekesa á-a-khílw-a/á-a-lób-a khu-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-fail-fv/refuse c15-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa failed/refused to go home.’

 b)??Wekesa á-a-khílw-a/á-a-lób-a á-ch-é engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-fail-fv/refuse SM.c1-go-fv.subj home

 ‘Wekesa failed/refused [go home].

 c)\*Wekesa á-a-khílw-a/á-a-lób-a á-a-ch-á engo (Indicative complement)

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-fail-fv/refuse SM.c1-PST-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa failed/refused [went home].

 d) \*Wekesa á-a-khílw-a/á-a-lób-a a-a-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-fail-fv/refuse SM.c1-ACT-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa failed/refused to go home.’

 25a) Wekesa á-a-khíngilil-a Maria khu-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-prevent-fv Mary c15-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa prevented Mary from going home.’

 b)??Wekesa á-a-khíngilil-a Maria á-ch-é engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-prevent-fv Mary SM.c1-go-fv.subj home

 ‘Wekesa prevented Mary [go home].’

 c) \*Wekesa á-a-khíngilil-a Maria á-a-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-prevent-fv Mary SM.c1-PST-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa prevented Mary she went home.’

 d) \*Wekesa á-a-khíngilil-a Maria a-a-ch-a engo

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-prevent-fv Mary SM.c1-ACT-go-fv home

 ‘Wekesa prevented Mary she went home’

Thus it could be said that ACs, by virtue of what they mean, only select predicates that do not preclude the possibility that the events or states of affairs described in their complements could have taken place. [The verbs *–khilw* and -*khíngilil*- also be disqualified if not treated as a PA verbs]

Key generalizations about the meaning of actual clauses.

 **26a) The actual clause proposition is must be true in the world of UTT.**

 **b) The event or state of affairs denoted by the actual clause proposition must be**

 **complete or in progress at the moment of speech by UTT.**

 **c) The actual clause functions as an assertion, such that the actual clause proposition**

 **is not presumed by UTT to be presupposed by any addressee.**

 **d) The world of UTT in which the actual clause proposition is true must be one of the**

 **worlds accessible to the attitude-holder or speaker of the predicate that takes the**

 **actual clause as a complement.**

The first three properties select for the class of predicates that are compatible with an actual clause complement. The last property is responsible for AC embedding and shows the influence of the matrix predicate on how the actual clause is interpreted in a given case.

**2.3 Shifts of Predicate Meaning Lubukusu**

 What I have been calling ‘infinitives’ in Lubukusu cause directive shift in Lubukusu for what appears to be the same class of predicates, namely, verbs of speaking that can involve an addressee argument.

 27a)Sara a-bol-el-a Jack a-li Lisa a-mu-siim-a o-mu-eene **Id: 1560**

 Sarah SM.c1-tell-APPL-fv Jack c1-that Lisa SM.c1-OM.c1-love-fv c1-c1-own

 ‘Sarah told Jack that Lisa loves him.’

 b) Ruth a-bol-el-a ba-holi khu-khol-a ba-ba-ana ba-ly-e **Id:11369**

 Ruth SM.c1-tell-APPL-fv c2-servant c15-make-fv c2-c2-child c2-eat-SBJV

 ’Ruth told the servants to make the children eat.’

 28a) Olando e-konjeleel-a ba-soleeli a-li Billi a-siim-a sitabu **Id: 11378**

 Orlando SM.c1-persuade-fv c2-boy c1-that Bill SM.c1-like-fv c7-book

 ‘Orlando persuaded the boys that Bill liked the book.’

 b) Olando e-konjeleel-a ba-soleeli khu-lol-a ku-mu-lukha **Id: 11379**

 Orlando SM.c1-persuade-fv c2-boy c15-see-fv c3-c3-ceremony

 ‘Orlando persuaded the boys to watch the ceremony.’

 29a) Olu a-a-lom-a a-li o-mu-eene a-a-i-bon-a o-mu-eene **Id: 1604**

 Olu SM.c1-PST-say-fv c1-that c1-c1-own SM.c1-pst-RFM-see-fv c1-c1-own

 ‘Olu said that he saw himself.’

 b) Edgar a-lom-a Bill khu-rung-a o-mu-eene **Id: 1582**

 Edgar SM.c1-PST-order-fv Bill c15-pay-fv c1-c1-own

 ‘Edgar ordered Bill to pay him.’

Notice that the translation of –*lom-*, ‘say’, is rendered as ‘order’ in (29b), which suggests that translation of Lubukusu *lom-* with English *order* disguises ***a predictable shift in predicate meaning that results from the selectional contribution of the complement clause type.***

***Thus, predicate meanings can be malleable*** - predicate meaning shift can be predictably induced by actual clause complementation in Lubukusu. Consider the predicate –*nyál-* in Lubukusu.

 30a) Wekesa á-a-nyál-a khu-khw-ombakh-a enju, ne kakhali

 Wekesa SM.c1-PST-able-fv c15-c15-build-fv house and though

 se á-a-nyóol-a bu-bw-aangu tá

 NEG SM.c1-PST-find-fv c14-c14-chance not

 ‘Wekesa was able to build the house, but he never got the chance.’

 b) Wekesa á-a-nyál-a o-ombakh-a enju, \*ne kakhali

 Wekesa SM.PST-manage-fv SM.c1.ACT-build-fv house and though

 se á-a-nyóol-a bu-bw-aangu tá

 NEG SM.c1-PST-find-fv c14-c14-chance not

 ‘Wekesa managed to build the house, \*but he never got the chance.’

While the infinitive complement for –*nyál-* shows the same ambiguity we would expect for the English predicate *be able*, when –*nyál-* takes an actual clause complement its meaning shifts in a completely predictable way; If Wekesa’s is able to bring about the building of the house and according to UTT, Wekesa has built the house, then Wekesa has succeeded.

**Conclusion**

 I have made several arguments that show how a clause can select the sorts of complements it is compatible with.

**Inflexible clause type meanings –** T

1. The semantic properties of the clause types is inflexible while the range of predicates they can be complements of is predictable from what the semantic properties of these clause types require.
* Two arguments of this type based on EIS and Lubukusu actual clauses.
1. An additional form of argument shows that the meaning of a predicate, and indeed classes of predicates, can be shifted when it has one type of clausal complement as opposed to another, suggesting once again that the clausal complement type is at least partially selecting the class of predicates that are compatible with its meaning.

Conclusion: For at least some kinds of clause types, their distribution as complements follows from what they semantically require of predicates they are compatible with.

APPENDICES

**Raising infinitives -** Do raising infinitives impose a particular semantics on the predicates they are complements of?

A small class of predicates like *threaten, promise,* and *prove,* allow for agentless aspectual interpretations, and raising in English seems to be associated with aspectual predicates. A1a) All hell threatened to break loose.

 b) There promises to be an animated discussion at the next meeting.

 c) There proved to be more than one solution.

Aspectual predicates like *there is apt/about/bound to be trouble* don’t have a transitive alternative, but also have “conditions are such that P” (also *be certain, likely*)or “changes are possibly changing such that P’ readings (*going, grow, continue, begin, come…*). The challenge is to distinguish these from *possible* and *probable* which are not raising.

**Eliciting judgments about Actual Clauses – Speaker’s commitment to truth**

Consultant was asked to consider (30) and give judgments as to whether or not the speaker S has appropriately used the actual according to the various scenarios that are contexts for when it is uttered (i.e, give a judgment for each context).

30) Wekesa á-eny-a Manchester United ya-a-khil-a Chelsea

 Wekesa SM.c1.PST-want-fv Manchester United SM.c?-ACT-defeat-fv Chelsea

 Wekesa wanted Manchester United to defeat Chelsea and they did.

NOTE: The complementizer *bali* is used to diminish UTT’s commitment to the truth of the complement clause proposition. It defuses the AE.

Scenario A: S hears the score on TV. OK because TV news is believable.

Scenario B: S hears the score from a gambler who sometimes lies to collect money on bets

he has lost. Consultant: “BAD- but can be (?) if the non-agreeing *bali* [introduces the actual

clause].”

Scenario C: S hears from an acquaintance who says he thinks he heard someone say what the

score was. “BAD, but OK with *bali*”

Scenario D: S hears the score from a friend who he knows is a big Manchester United fan. “Depends on whether the friend can be trusted on news about Man U results. If he often lies then BAD, but OK with *bali*. If the friend says the truth then OK (in this case it asserts S’ confidence in his friend).”

Scenario E: S has watched the end of the game on TV. OK