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3 **Partial content and expressions of part and whole**

4 **Discussion of Stephen Yablo: *Aboutness***

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8 **Abstract** This discussion of Yablo's book *Aboutness* focuses on the way partial
9 content and partial truth are reflected in natural language. It argues that natural
10 language reflects a content-based notion of part structure for a much greater range of
11 entities than Yablo acknowledges. Moreover, it argues that some of those entities
12 involve a notion of partial satisfaction rather than partial truth as well as, to an
13 extent, a notion of partial existence or validity.

14
15 **Keywords** Part-whole · Partial content · Attitudinal object · Cognitive product ·
16 Truthmaker semantics · Partial truth · Existence

17
18 Yablo's (2014) project is to show the importance of a notion of content individuated
19 by subject matter and not just truth conditions and to justify and formalize a notion
20 of part-of applying to such a notion of content. Partial content then serves to
21 illuminate of the notion of partial truth. In this discussion, I will set aside the formal
22 details of the theory of partial content and partial truth that Yablo develops and just
23 focus on the way natural language reflects those notions We will see that those
24 notions are extremely well-reflected in natural language in the applicability of part-
25 related expressions, but at the same time natural language intuitions motivate
26 modifications and a significant extension of the notions Yablo relies on. The
27 extension concerns the various sorts of entities that have partial content and involves
28 generalizing partial truth to partial satisfaction for a great range of those entities.
29 Natural language ontology clearly supports a notion of part applied to content. But it

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30 reflects a different and in fact much greater range of entities that come with a
31 content-based part structure than what Yablo's acknowledges.

32 I will also take closer look at the semantics of adverbs of completion such as
33 *partly* and *completely* which show a peculiar behavior with the predicate *true* when
34 they fail to relate to the actual parts of the subject referent. I will argue that this is
35 rather expected given an independently motivated semantic analysis of such
36 adverbs.

37 1 Part-related expressions applied to content-related entities

38 It is striking how well-reflected the notion of partial content is in natural language.
39 Most obviously, the partitive expressions *part of*, *all of*, *some of*, *most of*, *none of*, *a*
40 *great part of* etc apply to what is explicitly referred as a content, as below¹:

42 (1) part of/some of/all of/none of the content of the sentence

43 Yablo takes *part of* to apply to the content of sentence, a proposition. While *part of*
44 applies well to something explicitly referred to as a content, it does not seem to
45 apply well to what is explicitly referred to as a proposition, and it certainly could
46 not pick out parts of a structured proposition:

48 (2) ?? part of the proposition that the students are doing well

49 However, natural language displays a great range of content-related objects that
50 do display a part structure based on partial content. These are what I call 'attitudinal
51 objects' (Moltmann 2003, 2013a, 2014, to appear). Attitudinal objects include
52 entities of the sort of claims, assertions, suggestions, remarks, thoughts, that is,
53 illocutionary and cognitive products in the sense of Twardowski's (1911) distinction
54 between actions and products (Moltmann 2013a, 2014, to appear). Attitudinal
55 objects also include what one might better consider mental states, such as beliefs,
56

1FL01 ¹ Note that content is treated as mass, even if the content in question consists of well-individuated parts.
1FL02 Even in the latter case, *part* (or a *part*) needs to be chosen rather than the plural *parts*:

1FL03 (i) Part of/??? Parts of what John claimed, namely that the students have passed the exam, is true: Joe,
1FL04 Mary and Bill have passed the exam, though not Sue.

1FL07 Note, though, that plural-like mass nouns such as *furniture* or *police force* do not permit the plural *parts*
1FL08 either:

1FL09 (ii) a. ??? parts of the furniture

1FL12 b. ??? parts of the police force

1FL13 Only mass terms that stand for objects that are organized wholes and may have functional parts permit the
1FL14 plural *parts*:

1FL15 (iii) a. parts of the support (that is, the lampstand)

1FL18 b. parts of the reinforcement (of the table top)

1FL19 This indicates that the plural *parts* applies only to the parts of an object with a certain degree of integrity,
1FL20 parts of a functional whole, whether such a whole is referred to by a mass term or by a singular count
1FL21 term. For other observations regarding the difference between mass noun *part* and the singular count noun
1FL22 *part* see Moltmann (1998).

57 hopes, and fears (though not as states with a temporal or spatio-temporal part
58 structure).

59 Those objects all display a part structure based on partial, truth-evaluable
60 content, rather than the part structure of events or the part structure of a structured
61 proposition. This is clear from the way *part of* below is understood:

- 62 (3) a. Part of John's claim/suggestion/remark/is true.
66 b. Part of John's thought/judgment concerned his dog.
- 68 (4) a. Part of John's belief is true.
69 b. Part of John's fear became true.

70 *Part of* in (3) could not pick out temporal parts of an act, and in (4) it could not pick
71 out temporal parts of a state (in the standard sense of a state as something that
72 comes with temporal parts). Yet the terms in (3, 4) do not stand for 'pure contents'.
73 They stand for entities that generally have a limited life span and in the case of
74 products, are created or established by an illocutionary or mental act. Illocutionary
75 and cognitive products generally share their life span with the act that establishes
76 them.² This is linguistically reflected in the fact that if John's thought occurred to
77 him yesterday, then past tense needs to be used rather than present tense when
78 specifying the content of John's thought:

- 81 (5) a. John's thought was that Sue should study medicine.
83 b. ??? John's thought is that Sue should study medicine.

84 Moreover, attitudinal objects are dependent on particular agents, making the *is* of
85 identity generally inapplicable in cases as below, as opposed to *is the same as*,
86 which expresses close or exact similarity (which in this case amounts to 'being the
87 same in content'):
88

- 90 (6) a. ??? John's remark was Mary's remark.
92 b. John's remark was the same as Mary's remark.

93 Unlike propositions, furthermore, attitudinal objects enter causal relations including
94 perceptual relations, and unlike mental acts, they generally enter content-based
95 causal relations, as indicated by the contrast between (7a) and (7b):
96

- 99 (7) a. John's remark/claim/assertion caused surprise.
100 b. John's speech act caused surprise.
101

- 102 (8) Joe overheard John's remark.

106 Yes, despite being concrete particulars, attitudinal objects are largely characterized
107 by their content. Besides having a part structure driven by partial content, they
108 enter exact similarity relations strictly on the basis of being the same in content,

2FL01 ² Certain illocutionary or cognitive products may have a longer life span than the act that created them.
2FL02 They include products of the sort of ideas, hypothesis, proofs etc. (which are generally described by
2FL03 underived nouns).

109 provided they are of the same type, as in (9a). Again, they may enter partial
 110 similarity relations based on partial sharing of content, as in (9b):

- 112 (9) a. John's claim was the same as Mary's: they both claimed that Sue is guilty.
 113 b. John's claim was almost/partly the same as Mary's.

114 The adverbial modifiers *partially*, *completely*, *in part*, *to some extent* etc.
 115 generally relate to the content-related part structure of an attitudinal object and then
 116 may serve to convey partial truth (or, equivalently, correctness):

- 118 (10) a. John's judgment/belief is partly true.
 119 b. John's claim is partly correct.

119 But they may also serve to specify that part of or all of the content an attitudinal
 120 object is involved in an act of, for example, understanding, agreement, or
 121 remembering described by the verb:

- 123 (11) a. John partly understood Mary's claim.
 124 b. John partly agrees with Mary's claim that S.
 125 c. John in part recalled Mary's suggestion.

125 Not all attitudinal objects come with truth conditions. There is a great range of
 126 attitudinal objects that come with satisfaction conditions instead, of various sorts.
 127 Such attitudinal objects typically involving a world-word/mind-direction of fit,
 128 rather than a word/mind-world direction of fit, to use Searle's (1969, 1983) terms.
 129 Thus, requests, demands, promises, pieces of advice, and permissions would be
 130 satisfied, fulfilled, complied with, kept, followed, or taken up, rather than true.
 131 Moreover, a demand can be ignored or contravened and a promise broken, but
 132 neither can be false.³ Similarly, cognitive products like decisions can only be
 133 implemented or executed, but not be true, and so for mental states such as desires
 134 and intentions, which can only be fulfilled or realized. All such attitudinal objects
 136 come with a part structure based on partial content:

- 137 (12) a. Part of the demand/request was fulfilled.
 138 b. Part of Mary's desire was satisfied.
 139 c. Part of the offer was taken up.

138 For products of directive illocutionary acts, satisfaction may also be conveyed by
 139 agentive verbs. The *by*-locution may then mention a particular action as the satisfier
 140 or violator of the attitudinal object (which thus plays the same role as a truthmaker
 141 or falsemaker of a truth-directed attitudinal object):

- 143 (13) a. John fulfilled the demand by handing in the paper in time.
 144 b. John followed/ignored the advice by staying home.
 145 c. John realized only part of his intention.

3FL01 ³ The applicability of predicates of satisfaction makes particularly clear that nouns like *demand*, *request*,
 3FL02 *promise* etc. could not stand for acts or propositions: neither acts nor propositions can be fulfilled,
 3FL03 satisfied, taken up, or broken (Ulrich 1976). Rather such nouns stand for entities of a third kind—
 3FL04 attitudinal objects—which come with intrinsic satisfaction conditions.

144 Satisfaction-directed attitudinal objects also permit predication of what corresponds
145 to partial truth, namely partial satisfaction:

- 148 (14) a. The request/demand/desire was partly fulfilled.
149 b. The permission/offer was partly taken up.
150
151
152 (15) a. John partly satisfied the demand.
153 b. John partly followed Mary's advice.
154 c. John to a great extent realized his intention.

155 Note that for distinguishing illocutionary products of the sort of requests and
156 demands from attitudinal objects of the sort of permissions, an assignment of
157 content will not be enough. Partial (but not complete) fulfillment of an order goes
158 along with partial ignorance or violation of the order, whereas partial (but not
159 complete) taking up of a permission or offer won't go along with any sort of
160 violation.

161 Partial satisfaction of an attitudinal object cannot, as one might think, be reduced
162 to the partial truth of a proposition about the (complete) satisfaction of the
163 attitudinal object, in terms of an equivalence 'd is partly satisfied iff the proposition
164 that d is satisfied is partly true'. A least this won't be possible for the complete
165 violation an attitudinal object. While (16b) may be considered equivalent to (16a),
166 (17b) is hardly acceptable and certainly not equivalent to (17a):

- 167 (16) a. That John partly fulfilled the request is true.
168 b. That John fulfilled the request is partly true.
169
170 (17) a. That John completely violated the order is true.
171 b. ???That John violated the order is completely true.

172 Attitudinal objects constitute a significant class of content-bearing entities
173 displaying precisely the sort of content driven by subject matter that Yablo aims to
174 account for, but they are not of the sort of propositions.

175 One might think that there are also pure contents, that is, propositions, that
176 natural language permits reference to. One such case could be the semantic values
177 of relative-clause constructions of the sort *what John believes*. Relative clauses of
178 this sort allow for the same part-related expressions, which will then pick out partial
179 content:

- 180 (18) a. part of what John believes
181 b. part of what John decided
182 c. part of what John demanded
183
184 (19) What John said/believes is completely/partly true.

185 However, relative clauses of this sort, it appears, do not stand for propositions.
186 Rather they also stand for attitudinal objects (or kinds of them). That is because they
187 permit the same sorts of predicates as nominalizations that stand for attitudinal
188 objects, for example causal predicates or evaluative predicates, as below:

- 199 (20) a. What John claimed caused a commotion.
b. John's claim caused a commotion.
- 200 (21) a. What John thought is shocking.
b. John's thought is shocking.
- 201 Such predicates would not be applicable to propositions or pure contents, which
202 could not enter causal relations and could not be 'shocking'.
- 203 Moreover, relative-clause constructions of the relevant sort stand for things that
204 need not have truth conditions, but may have satisfaction conditions instead,
206 depending on the illocutionary verb they contain:
- 207 (22) a. ??? What John demanded (that Bill should help) was true.
b. What John demanded was complied with.
- 208 (23) a. ??? What Mary promised, namely that she would help, turned out to be
true.
b. Mary did not fulfill what she promised.
- 209 In fact, *what* is arguably not an ordinary relative pronoun, but a nominalizing
210 device, permitting reference to the very same entities as are the semantic values of
211 the corresponding (product) nominalizations (Moltmann 2013a, 2015a, b).
- 212 There are some cases where *partly* and *completely* relate to a *that*-clause and thus
213 apparently the semantic content of a sentence. First, *that*-clauses in subject position
214 seem to go along with *partly* and *completely* as adverbial modifiers:
- 215 (24) a. That John's family is German is partly true.
b. That John committed the crime is to a great extent implausible.
- 216 In addition, *partly* and *completely* may relate to a *that*-clause complement while
217 modifying certain types of attitude verbs:
- 220 (25) a. John partly denied that the students failed the exam.
b. John partly agreed that Bill is lazy.
- 221 (26) a. John partly recognizes that he failed.
b. John partly acknowledges that he made serious mistakes.
- 222 However, *that*-clauses in these contexts do not in fact serve as proposition-referring
223 terms. Subject-clauses as in (24a, b) generally serve to characterize a contextually
224 given claim rather than standing for a proposition (Moltmann 2015a). Also with so-
225 called 'response-stance verbs' as in (25a, b), *that*-clauses generally serve to
226 characterize something like a contextually given claim, allowing for the substitution
227 of the *that*-clause by (*with*) *the claim that S*.⁴ With factive verbs as in (26a, b), *that*-
228 clauses serve to characterize a fact, allowing for substitution of the *that*-clause by
229 *the fact that S*.
- 230 Are there other entities besides attitudinal objects (that is, illocutionary and
231 cognitive products and mental states in a relevant sense) that display a part structure

4FL01 ⁴ The notion of a response-stance verb is due to Cattell (1978), who argues that response-stance verbs
4FL02 share relevant syntactic properties with factive verbs.

232 based on partial content? There is one class of objects that should be added, and
 233 these are what I call ‘modal products’, entities such as obligations, laws, rules,
 234 permissions, and offers (Moltmann 2015b, to appear). The *part of*-construction
 235 applies naturally to deontic modal products, picking out a partial content:

- 238 (27) a. Part of John’s obligation is to help Mary.
 239 b. Part of the offer is to use the house in summer.
 240 c. Part of the law concerns children.

241 Deontic modal products result generally from directive illocutionary acts, such as
 242 acts of commanding, offering, or promising, or acts of declaring or passing a law.
 243 Unlike illocutionary products, modal products may endure way past the time of the
 244 act that establishes them. But like illocutionary products of directive speech acts,
 245 modal products come with satisfaction conditions. Thus an obligation or law can be
 246 fulfilled, a rule followed, and an offer taken up. Modal products then also allow for
 247 partial satisfaction:

- 250 (28) a. John partly fulfilled his obligation.
 251 b. John partly followed the law/the rule.

252 There are other modal objects that in a way display a part structure based on
 253 partial content, though they are not the product of acts. These are entities of the sort
 254 of abilities, habits, implicit rules, and dispositions. With them, *part of* picks out part
 255 of the constitutive conditions making up the modal objects (as in *part of John’s*
 256 *special ability*, *part of John’s habit*). Of course, modal objects of the sort of abilities
 257 and habits cannot be true or false or even satisfied or ignored (that is, not satisfied),
 258 but they can be manifested and then in fact partly manifested. An activity that is a
 259 partial manifestation of an ability is a manifestation of part of the ability.

261 Besides truth and satisfaction, there is another notion that may involve partial
 262 content and that is validity or existence when applied to modal objects. Note that
 263 validity amounts to existence for modal objects such as obligations, laws, rules,
 264 promises and offers. Thus, if an obligation partly no longer exists, this means that a
 265 part of it, a partial content or part of the conditions making it up, no longer is in
 266 place or valid. In the same way, a law or promise may partly be no longer valid,
 267 which means that a partial content or part of its constitutive conditions may no
 268 longer be ‘in place’. Partial existence or validity is of course an entirely different
 269 notion than partial satisfaction, but both notions involve the very same part
 270 structure, based on partial content.

271 The content-based part structure of modal products also accounts for the ability
 272 of modal products to exist—or, equivalently, hold, obtain, or be valid—at different
 273 temporal or spatial locations.⁵ Thus, the following statements may be true:

- 276 (29) a. The obligation to pay taxes still exists/holds in this country.
 277 b. The law is valid in several countries.

5FL01 ⁵ *Exist* is not the only existence predicate applicable to modal products; *hold*, *obtain*, and *be valid* are in
 5FL02 fact better applicable as existence predicates to modal products such as obligations, permissions, and
 5FL03 promises. See Moltmann (2013b) for a discussion of existence predicates in natural language.

- c. The permission to skip a class obtains only in this school.
 d. John's promise is still valid today.

280 As Fine (2006) has pointed out, certain objects may exist not just at different times,
 281 but also at different spatial locations. Entities that clearly can exist at different
 282 spatial locations are, for example, kinds and languages, and more generally objects
 283 whose parts are 'abstract' parts (Moltmann 2013b). Only abstract parts can all be
 284 'present', that is, instantiated or otherwise 'in place', throughout the spatial location
 285 of the object. This matches the traditional (if controversial) view of endurance
 286 according to which the existence of an object at a temporal location amounts to its
 287 complete presence throughout that location, that is, to the presence of (more or less)
 288 all its parts at any subinterval of that temporal location.⁶ Generalizing that view to
 289 existence at a spatial or temporal location means that the existence of an object d at
 290 a location l amounts to the complete presence of d throughout l . Clearly then, given
 291 their ability to exist at different times and spatial locations, modal products could
 292 not be viewed as states with a spatio-temporal part structure. Rather their parts
 293 should be considered partial contents. Only then can modal objects be wholly
 294 present at different locations, with their content parts being 'in place' at those
 295 locations, that is, with their constitutive conditions holding at those locations.

296 To summarize then, partial content and partial truth are extremely well-reflected
 297 in the application of part-related expressions in natural language, but there is a
 298 different and much greater range of objects that have a part structure based on
 299 partial content than is acknowledged by Yablo, or so our linguistically reflected
 300 intuitions tell us. In addition, partial content plays an equally important role for
 301 satisfaction as it does for truth with that range of objects and it may play a role for
 302 the notion of existence as well. This, of course, also means that Yablo's project as
 303 such has a much greater scope and range of applications than what it so far has set
 304 out to cover, and it is further indicative of how important the project is.

305 2 The semantics of adverbs of completion

306 Partial truth does not generally amount to truth of a part, as Yablo (2014, p. 48f)
 307 acknowledges. That is the equivalence below does not generally hold:

308 (30) p is partly true iff part of p is true.

309 As Yablo points out, if a sentence is partially true, then there need not be part of the
 310 sentence that is true. Partial truth of a content bearer does not amount to truth of a
 311 part of the content bearer, but rather to truth of a part of the content. Here are a few
 312 other cases where partial truth does not amount to truth of a part, now involving
 313 terms very similar to the ones for attitudinal objects:

6FL01 ⁶ For a defense of that view as the one operative for the application of existence predicates in natural
 6FL02 language see Moltmann (2013b). Fine (2006) does not adopt that view, though, and he gives different
 6FL03 examples for space-relative existence, which I consider problematic (Moltmann 2013b).

- 316 (31) a. What John said is partly true.
 317 b. Part of what John said is true.
- 319 (32) a. John's utterance is partly true.
 320 b. Part of John's utterance is true.
- 322 (33) a. What John wrote down is partly true.
 323 b. Part of what John wrote down is true.

324 That is, the a-sentences above are not equivalent to the b-sentences. *What John said*
 325 and *what John wrote down* refer to products of an act of saying or writing, that is, an
 326 utterance (or token) or a piece of writing. A product of an act of saying or writing
 327 has its parts physical or structural parts, parts which are not partial contents, making
 328 the part relation inapplicable.

329 Only for products of illocutionary or cognitive acts or belief states does the
 330 equivalence in (30) hold. That is, (34a) and (34b) are equivalent to (34c), and (35a)
 331 and (35b) are equivalent to (35c):

- 334 (34) a. What John believes is partly true.
 335 b. John's belief is partly true.
 336 c. Part of John's belief is true.
- 338 (35) a. What John claimed is partly true.
 339 b. John's claim is partly true.
 340 c. Part of John's claim is true.

341 (30) holds only for entities whose parts are contents and not structural or physical
 342 parts of content bearers. This raises a semantic question, namely the question of
 343 what the semantics of *partly* actually is, given that it cannot simply be considered a
 344 quantifier ranging over the parts of the referent of the relevant noun phrase.

345 More generally, this is the question of the semantics of adverbs of completion,
 346 adverbs like *partly*, *completely*, *to some extent* etc. In Moltmann (1997), I had
 347 developed a semantic analysis of adverbs of completion based on the possibility for
 348 the part structure of the described event to be multidimensional. This analysis can
 349 also shed light on the particular semantic behavior of *partly* with the predicate *true*.

350 Like *partly*, *completely* can relate to the part structure of the subject referent. But
 351 it also has another reading, available for the sentences below⁷:

- 354 (36) a. The buildings in the city were completely destroyed.
 355 b. The sky is completely black.

356 In addition to the part-related reading according to which (36a) is equivalent to
 357 'every building in the city was destroyed' and (36b) to 'every part of the sky was
 358 black', there are what one may call 'degree-related readings'.⁸ On such a reading,

7FL01 ⁷ For some reason, no degree-related reading is available for *partly*:
 7FL03 (i) The sky is partly black.

8FL01 ⁸ Note that *true* does not permit degree-related readings, which indicates that the philosophy of language
 8FL02 implicit in natural language itself does not permit degrees of truth, as some vagueness theories would
 8FL03 have it.

359 (36a) basically, says that the buildings in the city have reached the highest degree of
 360 destruction (though some building might have been spared entirely), and (36b)
 361 means something like ‘the sky has reached the highest degree of blackness’ (while a
 362 small part of the sky may not be black at all).

363 The degree-related reading makes clear that *completely* cannot be a quantifier
 364 ranging the parts of the participant. Instead, *completely* in (36a) is better considered
 365 an expression relating the parts of a particular event to the parts of a type of event.
 366 Crucially, both the particular event and the event type may have at least two part
 367 structures: a participant-related part structure and a degree-related part structure.
 368 *Completely* then specifies that all the parts of one of the part structures of the event
 369 type are instantiated by parts of one of the part structures of the particular event. The
 370 event type of destruction described in (36a) has a participant-related part structure
 371 which matches roughly the parts of the entity or collection of entities undergoing the
 372 destruction. In addition, it has a part structure corresponding to degrees of
 373 destruction.

374 For adjectives like *black*, tropes (that is, particularized properties) arguably play
 375 the very same semantic role as events play in the semantics of verbs within
 376 Davidsonian event semantics. For (36b) this would be the trope that is ‘the
 377 blackness of the sky’. *Completely* in (36b) will then relate a particular trope to a
 378 type of trope, specifying that all the parts of one of the part structures of the trope
 379 type are instantiated by parts of one of the part structures of the particular trope. The
 380 trope type of blackness will have one part structure that corresponds to the parts of
 381 the bearer (that is, parts of the sky) and another part structure that corresponds to
 382 degrees of blackness.

383 Given this account, the logical form of (36b) will be roughly as below, where the
 384 meaning of the adjective *black* is taken to be a relation between tropes and types of
 385 tropes and T(P) is the type of entity instantiating the property P, that is, a type of
 386 trope:

387 (37) $\exists t \text{ completely}(t, T(\lambda t'([\text{black}(t', \text{the sky}])))$

388 The meanings of *partly* and *completely* will then be relations between events or
 389 tropes and event types or trope types, as below:

390 (38) The semantics of adverbs of completion

- a. For an event or trope e and an event type or trope type E , *partly*(e, E) iff one of the part structures of e instantiates some parts of one of the part structures of E
- b. For an event or trope e and an event type or trope type E , *completely*(e, E) iff one of the part structures of e instantiates all the parts of one of the part structures of E .

391 Given this, adverbs of completion will not directly apply to parts of objects, but
 392 rather relate particular events or tropes to event types or trope types in terms of one
 393 of their part structures. A part structure of an event or trope that is induced by a
 394 participant need not directly correspond to the parts of the participant, but rather the
 395 participant may just be associated with a part structure that imposes a part structure

396 on the event or trope. This would be the case with participants that are content
 397 bearers, which impose a content-related part structure on the event or trope type.

398 Note that with other predicates than *true*, *partly* and *completely* can relate to
 399 structural parts of a sentence or utterance:

- 402 (40) a. The sentence is partly ungrammatical.
 403 b. What John said was partly inaudible.

404 Whereas *partly* and *completely* allow for various participant-related part
 405 structures, other expressions of completion may impose particular restrictions on
 406 the part structure they may relate to. *Fully* is restricted to event types with a
 407 particular boundary and as such may relate only to a structured part structure, such
 408 as that of a structured content bearer, as in (41a, b), not a content-based part
 409 structure, as in (41c, d)⁹:

- 413 (41) a. The sentence is fully grammatical.
 414 b. Mary has not fully understood what John said/John's utterance.
 415 c. ??? John's claim is fully true.
 416 d. ?? Mary has not fully understood what John claims/John's claim.

417 To summarize, a semantic analysis of adverbs of completion that takes into
 418 account their more general semantic behavior can shed light on a semantic
 419 peculiarity of *partly*, namely that with a sentence as subject referent, *partly* is able to
 420 relate to the parts of the content of the sentence rather than the parts of the sentence
 421 itself.
 422
 423

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9FL01 ⁹ Some adverbs of completion, for example, *entirely* may relate only to a part structure corresponding to
 9FL02 a participant, and not a degree-related part structure, for example English *entirely*:

9FL03 (i) The sky is entirely black.

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