**A Truthmaker Semantics for Modals**

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**Abstract**

This talk will outline a novel truthmaker semantics of modals by focusing not on possible
worlds and quantifiers ranging over them, but on what I will call modal objects and their
satisfaction conditions. On this view, modal verbs take modal objects as their implicit
(Davidsonian) argument and the subject or complement clause or prejacent of the modal
acts as a predicate characterizing the modal object in terms of its satisfiers (truthmakers) and possibly violators (falsifiers). For that purpose, the semantic account will make use of a development of Fine’s recent truthmaker semantics with its central notion of exact truthmaking and its notion (exact) false-making, allowing exact truthmaking (satisfaction) and false-making (violation) to also hold between an action or situation and a modal object. The semantics will assign the same logical form to sentences with modals of necessity and sentences with modals of possibility