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**Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants**

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**1. Introduction**

Philosophical theories of truth generally focus on *true* when it occurs with a *that*-clause ora sentence- or proposition-referring term:

(1) a. That Paris is the capital of France is true.

b. The sentence ‘Paris is the capital of France’ is true.

c. The proposition that Paris is the capital of France is true.

Here: focus on truth predicates when they occur with referential NPs:

(2) a. John’s belief that S is true.

b. John’s judgment that S is true.

c. John’s claim is true.

Take into account variants of the predicate *true*:

* Predicates of correctness when they convey truth
* Predicates of satisfaction
* Predicates of validity

Take into account the full range of bearers of truth or satisfaction: attitudinal objects

* Beliefs, judgments, claims etc as truth bearers
* Requests, desires, hopes, obligations, permissions etc as bearers of satisfaction conditions

Take into account the possibility of partial truth, partial satisfaction, and partial validity

Conclusions

* Attitudinal objects act as the bearers of truth or satisfaction, even in clausal constructions
* Truth as special case of correctness, as the norm intrinsic to certain types of attitudinal objects
* Truth conditions as a special case of satisfaction conditions
* Predicates of satisfaction and the possibility of partiality of truth or satisfaction go along best with a truthmaker theory (along the lines of Fine’s recent truthmaker semantics)
* Force now consists in conditions on truthmaking / satisfaction of modal or attitudinal objects; thus no content-force distinction!

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**2. Attitudinal objects**

Common view

Nouns like *judgment* and *claim* are ambiguous between standing for mental events or speech acts and propositions.

The present view

They always stand for objects of a third kind: ‘attitudinal objects’ (Moltmann 2013, 2014, 2017a).

Some evidence

- Copredication:

(3) a. John remembered his false judgment that S.

b. Mary overheard John’s true claim that S.

- Understanding of part-related expressions: *part of* picks out partial content with attitudinal objects, but does not really apply to propositions, with a clear intuitive understanding:

(4) a. part of the claim / belief / judgment

b. ??? Part of the proposition that John came and that Mary left is that John came.

- Predicates of satisfaction

(5) a. John fulfilled the request.

b. ??? John fulfilled the act of requesting / the speech act.

(6) a. John broke his promise.

b. ??? John broke the act of promising / the speech act.

- Attitudinal objects enter similarity relations strictly on the basis of being the same in content, provided they are of the same type (Moltmann 2014, to appear a):

(7) a. John’s claim was the same as Mary’s.

b. John’s claim was partly the same as Mary’s.

Kinds of attitudinal objects

(8) a. John’s claim that S is true.

b. The claim that S is true / is widely believed / has never been maintained.

Sharing of content

either similarity of attitudinal objects or sharing of a kind of attitudinal object

(9) a. John’s belief is the same as Mary’s.

b. John and Mary share the belief that S.

The logical form of attitude reports

(10) a. John thinks that S.

b. ∃e(think(e, John) & [*that* S](prod(e)))

(11) a. John thinks the same thing as Mary

b. ∃e∃e’’ ∃d(think(e, John) & d = prod-kind(e)) & think(e’, Mary) &

d = prod-kind(e’)))

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**3. *Correct* as a truth predicate**

Correctness and the norm of truth

The truth of attitudinal objects can also be conveyed by *correct* (or *right*):

(12) a. John’s belief is correct.

b. John’s judgment that S is correct.

c. John’s claim that S is correct.

*Correct* conveys truth and nothing else with truth-directed attitudinal objects

Different reading for *correct* applying to sentences:

(13) a. This sentence is correct.

*Correct* inapplicable to propositions

(13) b. ??? The proposition that Mary left is correct.

Usual normative use of *correct*:

*Correct* relates to norm intrinsic to the object or else one that is contextually given

(14) a. The dancer’s movements were correct.

b. John’s punishment was correct.

The distinction between actions and their products

(15) a. John’s making a judgment / John’s judging / John’s raising an objection was correct.

b. John’s speech act / John’s making a claim / John’s claiming was right.

Compare:

(16) a. The signature is correct.

b. The act of signing is correct.

Predicates of correctness convey truth and just truth when applied to objects like beliefs, judgments and claims (a crosslinguistic universal?)

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**4. Predicates of satisfaction**

Some attitudinal objects have satisfaction conditions, rather than truth conditions:

(17) a. John’s requests / demand / promise was satisfied / fulfilled.

b. The permission / offer was taken up.

(18) a. The demand was executed / ignored.

b. The promise was broken.

(19) a. The intention / decision was implemented / realized.

b. The desire was fulfilled.

(20) a. John fulfilled the demand by handing in the paper in time.

b. John followed / ignored the advice by staying home.

Satisfaction (or violation) may also be conveyed by agentive verbs, with the *by-*locution describing a particular action as the satisfier (or violator) of the attitudinal object:

(21) a. John fulfilled the demand by handing in the paper in time.

b. John followed / ignored the advice by staying home.

Satisfaction conditions and truthmaker theory (Fine to appear a):

not entire worlds stand in the satisfaction relation to a request, promise, hope, intention, or decision, but rather actions (or situations) that are *wholly relevant* for the satisfaction of the request, promise, intention, or decision.

What characterizes attitudinal objects that have satisfaction conditions rather than truth conditions

Attitudinal objects that require the world to fit the representation, rather than the representation fit the world (‘world-word/mind-direction of fit’, rather than a ‘word/mind-world direction of fit’ (Searle 1969, 1983))

Nonfactive future-oriented emotive attitudinal objects:

(22) a. John’s hope / desire / prediction that he would win yesterday was fulfilled.

b. ??? John’s hope that he had locked the door was fulfilled.

(23) a. John’s hope that he would win became true.

b. John’s hope that the key remained in the lock was fulfilled / ??? was true /

??? became true.

Such attitudinal objects also have a world-word/mind-direction of fit: they require to world to trigger a positive emotive response.

Other future-oriented attitudinal objects:

(24) John’s prediction was fulfilled / became true / ??? was true.

(Deontic) modal objects

obligations, needs, permissions, offers, invitations, laws, rules

Have satisfaction conditions, with a world-word/mind direction of fit

(25) a. The obligation may be satisfied, fulfilled, or complied with.

b. The offer taken up or accepted.

A modal object produced by an illocutionary act shares its satisfaction conditions with the illocutionary product that the same act produces, but it generally has a different lifespan.

Common characteristic of attitudinal and modal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit and future-oriented attitudinal objects

At the time at which attitudinal and modals objects exist, there are different actions / states of affairs in different future world states that satisfy the attitudinal object.

Disjunctive or existentially quantified beliefs may have several states of affairs that make them (actually) true, but those states of affairs would all be part of the actual circumstance.

Modal objects of necessity and of possibility

Attitudinal and modal objects that have a world-word/mind direction of fit or are future-oriented can be ‘satisfied’ or ‘fulfilled’ only if their modal force is that of necessity.

Proposals, permissions, offers, and invitations cannot be ‘satisfied’ or ‘fulfilled’; instead an offer may be ‘taken up’ and an invitation ‘accepted’.

What does the difference consist in?

Unlike requests and obligations, proposals, permissions, offers, and invitations cannot be *violated*:

- Not taking up an offer or accepting an invitation is not a violation, but not satisfying a demand or fulfilling a promise is.

- Whatever action is performed in virtue of which the demand or request fails to be satisfied, that action is a violator of the request or demand.

- Offers and invitations can be declined or refused, but that does not amount to a violation.

*- Ignore* conveys violation with modal objects of necessity, but with modal objects of possibility it conveys simple failure to satisfy it: ignoring a permission is not violating it; but ignoring a command or request is.

Intentions and Decisions

Not all attitudinal objects with a world-mind/word direction of fit permit predicates such as *satisfied* or *fulfilled*, for example intentions and decisions. What distinguishes intentions and decisions from requests, promises?

Satisfaction and the truthmaker approach to the content of attitudinal and modal objects

The differences among satisfaction predicates reflect the availability of satisfiers in different circumstances, the relation of satisfiers to the attitudinal object, as well the presence or absence of violators. They could not be formulated if attitudinal and modal objects were just assigned a set of worlds as their content, but rather they support a truthmaker approach to the content of attitudinal and modal objects.

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**5. Predicates of validity**

Modal objects: obligations, permissions, offers, invitations

Modal objects have satisfaction conditions

And they have conditions of validity, which correspond to the truth of the corresponding modal sentence

(26) a. The obligation for Mary to work still holds.

b. The permission / offer for Mary to use the house is still valid.

(27) a. That Mary still has to work is true.

b. That Mary has to work is still true.

(28) a. That Mary may still use the house is true.

b. That Mary may use the house is still true.

Modal objects include laws:

(29) a. The law that one must have a passport still obtains.

b. That one must have a passport is still true.

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**6. Partial truth, satisfaction, and validity**

(30) a. John’s belief is partly true.

b. John’s claim is partly correct.

c. Mary’s desire was partly satisfied.

d. The offer was partly taken up.

e. The offer is now only partly valid.

*Partly* relates to the content-based part structure of an attitudinal object.

(31) a. Part of John’s belief is true.

b. Part of John’s claim is correct.

c. Part of Mary’s desire was satisfied.

d. Part of the offer was taken up.

Agent-related predicates of satisfaction:

(32) a. John partly satisfied the demand.

b. John partly followed Mary’s advice.

Modal objects:

(33) a. John partly fulfilled his obligation.

b. John partly followed the law / the rule.

(34) a. Part of John’s obligation is to help Mary.

b. Part of the offer is to use the house in summer.

Truthmaker semantics provides a straightforward notion of partial content (Fine 2017):

(35) For sets A and B of situations or actions, B is a *partial content* of A iff every satisfier of

A contains a satisfier of B and every satisfier of B is contained in a satisfier of A.

A notion of a partial content of an attitudinal and modal object

(36) A set B of situations or actions is a *partial content* of an attitudinal or modal object o iff

B is a partial content of sat-cont(o).

cont(o), the content of o, consists of a set of satisfiers sat-cont(o) and a possibly empty set of violators viol-cont(o).

(37) a. An (attitudinal or modal) object o is *partially satisfied* iff there is an actual situation or

action s and a partial content B of o such that s ∈ B.

b. A (potential) modal object o is *partially valid* if there is a partial content B of o such

that some modal object d such that B = sat-cont(d) exists.

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**7. Truth predicates with sentential subjects.**

Evidence that *true* with a *that*-clause does not apply to a proposition, but rather to an attitudinal object

1. The applicability of the normative truth predicate *correct* to *that*-clauses

*Correct*, which is inapplicable to propositions, is unproblematic with *that*-clauses (in subject position and when extraposed), and then, as with beliefs and claims, it conveys truth (and just truth):

(38) a. That John is the director is correct.

b. It is correct that John is the director.

2. The applicability of part-related expressions. Adverbial modifiers such as *partly* may relate to a *that*-clause in subject position:

(39) That John’s family is German is partly true.

(40) a. Part of the claim that John’s family is German is true.

b. ?? Part of the proposition that John’s family is German is true

*That*-clauses with *true* as predicate serve to characterize a claim, suggestion, or hypothesis to which the speaker refers with the silent (or at least partly silent) DP in the subject position. This interpretation would correspond to a syntactic structure in which the subject DP contains a silent head noun specified for an assertive illocutionary product and the *that*-clause appears in or relates to the position following the silent noun.

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**8. Conclusion**

*True* and its variants act syntactically and semantically predicates, namely of attitudinal objects, even with *that*-clauses.

The generalizations about truth-related predicates in natural language cannot go along with a deflationist or minimalist account of truth (Horwich 1990, Kuenne 2003).

(41) [S] is true iff S.

- inapplicable to correct when conveying truth

- inapplicable to satisfaction predicates

- inapplicable to partial truth or satisfaction

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