

Workshop *The Ontology of the Mind and Its Linguistic Reflection: Emotions*

April 28, 2022

Some Remarks on the Emotions-Language Connection

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The nature of emotions:

Different philosophical views: as judgments, perceptions, action-related attitudes, evaluations
The relation of emotions to cognitive attitudes as presuppositions (belief, memory, imagination, ..), which manifests itself linguistically in factivity (!)

Reflection of emotions in language:

1. Description of emotions
2. Expressive language
3. Are emotions encoded in grammar or only in the lexicon?

Emotions directed toward an object:

- (1) a. John fears the upcoming exam.

Emotions with a propositional content or directed toward a state of affairs or fact:

- (1) b. John hopes that S / # the possibility that S / the situation in which S.
c. John regrets that S / the fact that S.

'Pure' emotions directed towards facts, but do not have propositional content

- (2) a. John's claim, request, judgment, thought that S.
b. # John's regret / happiness that S.

Linguistic test distinguishing object and content of attitudes:

Specificational sentences specify content, not object:

- (3) a. John's claim, request, judgment, thought is that S. (content)
b. # John's regret / happiness is that S. (object)
c. John's fear / hope is that S. (content)

What sorts of objects are emotions?

Mental events or states / dispositions?

Twardowskian products or attitudinal objects?

Properties of products / attitudinal objects:

- Are concrete mind-dependent particulars,
- Are content-oriented: come with satisfaction conditions, part structure based on partial content, enter similarity relations on the basis of being the same in content

Claims, promises, thoughts as products of speech acts or mental acts.

Emotions as products of mental / physical events? If emotions are products, they are presumably products or results of multiple acts or events: evaluations, bodily perceptions etc

Emotions need not have satisfaction conditions

- (4) a. ??? John's anger is true / fulfilled / violated.
 b. John's hope was fulfilled.
 c. John's fear became true.

Part structure of pure emotions not based on partial content:

- (5) a. part of John's anger / happiness (not partial content)
 b. part of John's hope / fear is that S (partial content)

Conditions of correctness or fitting of emotions:

Linguistic reflection? *right* relating to content or appropriateness of emotions

- (6) a. You are right to assume that S. (justification)
 b. You are right to be angry that S. (fitting)
 (7) a. Your assumption is right. (truth)
 b. ?? Your anger is right.
 (8) a. John is right in claiming that S
 b. John is right in being disappointed that S
 (9) a. Your claim is right. (truth)
 b. ?? Your disappointment is right.

Emotion-specific constructions (?):

Psych-verb constructions with object experiencers:

- (10) That S angered / pleased John.

Feelings vs emotions:

Impersonal perception reports – restricted to feelings?

- (11) a. It looks / feels as if it is going to rain.
 b. It is unpleasant that S.
 c. ??? it is angry that S.
 e. ??? It is happy that S.
 d. ok It is sad that S.

References

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 ----- (2022): 'Tastes and the Ontology of Impersonal Perception Reports', in J. Wyatt, J. Zakkou, and D. Zeeman (eds): *Perspectives on Taste*. Routledge, New York.