*Ontoformat Project*

University of Milan, June 24, 2016

**Natural Language Ontology**

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**1. The practice of natural language ontology**

The view

Natural language involves its own ontology (ontological categories and structures), an ontology that may be different from the ones a philosopher may be willing to accept or that would be needed for particular sorts of purposes, such as the development of scientific theories.

Terminology

Natural language ontology or natural language metaphysics:

the discipline whose aim is to uncover the ontological categories and structures implicit in natural language

The ontology of natural language:

the ontological categories and structures implicit in natural language

Natural language ontology contrasts with:

* Ontology for a particular purpose, ontological structure involved in particular scientific theory
* Fundamental ontology: the ontology of what there ‘really’ is, involving fundamental ontological categories and structures

Strawson

Descriptive metaphysics: aims to uncover our shared conceptual scheme, or better the ontological categories and structures as we implicitly or ordinarily conceive of them

Revisionary metaphysics: aims to conceive of a ‘better’ ontology, for particular purposes

Fine:

Shallow metaphysics, naïve metaphysics: the metaphysics of appearances, reflected in language or otherwise in our not language-driven judgments

Fundamental metaphysics: the metaphysics of what there ‘really’ is

A common view about the ontology of natural language

Natural language involves a wealth of referential permitting reference to a great range of abstract and derivative objects, many of which are unacceptable or at least problematic philosophically.

Reactions:

* reject (part of) the ontology of natural language
* consider the contested entities to be ‘language-created’ or ‘pleonastic’ entities
* properly analyse natural language and arrive at a different view of the ontology natural language involves
* accept and make sense of the rich ontology of natural language

Other uses of natural language ontology

Support a philosophical view:

* Medieval philosophers when arguing for nominalist / platonist views
* Twardowski when arguing for a cognitive notion of a truth bearer
* Frege when arguing for numbers as objects or for propositions
* Many philosophers of language or mind when arguing for propositions

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**2. How to characterize the ontology of natural language**

First proposal

The ontology accepted by ‘ordinary’ speakers

No:

ordinary speakers may engage in reflections upon what there is and accept ontological views not compatible with that reflected in natural language.

Better:

The ontology of implicit in natural language, presupposed by the use of natural language.

(1) The ontology of natural language

The ontology a speaker accepts *when* using natural language.

Note:

The ontology of natural language may stay neutral on various issues in metaphysics, e.g. fundamentality, personal identity, the nature of causation, the existence / nature of good etc.

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**3. What data should natural language ontology take into consideration?**

**3.1. Presuppositions vs assertions**

Judgments natural language ontology should not take into consideration:

(2) a. There are propositions.

b. Events are property instances.

c. Numbers are objects.

(3) a.. That 2 is prime is a proposition.

b. John’s arrival is a property instance.

c. Three is a number.

Criterion 1

The ontology of natural language is reflected in presuppositions, not asserted contents of commonly used sentences (sentences not uttered as a result of philosophical reflection).

Examples of ontologically relevant presuppositions

Lexical presuppositions, semantic selectional requirements

Existence predicates

Events vs objects (Cresswell 1986, Moltmann 2013c):

(4) a. John’s arrival took place yesterday.

b. ??? John’s arrival existed yesterday.

(5) a. ??? The building took place last year.

b. The building existed last year.

Other predicates

Acts vs products (Moltmann 2013b):

(6) a. John’s claim is true.

b. ??? John’s speech act is true.

(7) a. John kept / broke his promise.

b. ??? John kept / broke his speech act.

Facts vs events (Vendler)

(8) a. John observed Bill’s arrival.

b. ??? John observed the fact that Bill arrived.

Lexical presuppositions are important for identifying and characterizing ontological categories that are part of the ontology of natural language.

**3.2. Identity statements**

Identity statements:

Frege: terms standing for objects have the ability of ‘flanking the identity symbol’

Identity statements assert, rather than presuppose the identity of objects by the two terms

Relevant identity statements:

(9) a. The number of planets is eight. (Frege)

b. John’s belief is that 2 is prime.

(10) a. ??? John’s remark is his belief. (Moltmann 2013b)

b. ??? The number of planets is the number nine. (Moltmann 2013a, b)

Irrelevant identity statements:

(11) a. The number nine is the number nine.

b. The proposition that it is raining is the proposition that John believes.

(12) a. The number nine is nine.

b. The proposition that S is what John believes.

Criterion 2

The ontology of natural language is reflected in judgments regarding identity statements not involving technical terms / terms of *the periphery of language*.

Less relevant for the ontology of natural language:

Sentences with ‘technical or quasi-technical terms

(13) a. the number nine

b. the concept horse

c. the truth value true

d. the direction north

The construction of ‘reifying terms’ (Moltmann 2013a, b):

definite determiner – sortal – nonreferential material

Quotational construction in (13) and below?

(14) a. the word ‘nine’

b. the noun ‘horse’

c. the adjective ‘true’

(15) a. The proposition that S

b. The fact / possibility that S

**3.3. Periphery vs core of language**

Reifying terms as terms in the periphery of language

Criterion 3

The ontology of natural language is reflected in the *core* of language, not its *periphery*.

However, somehow the possibility of using the periphery of language, extending language with the use of philosophical terms must also be accounted for.

**3.4. Sortal predication**

Less relevant data

(16) a. That it is raining is a proposition.

b. John’s arrival is an event.

c. Wisdom is a property.

d. Socrates’ wisdom is a trope.

Problem: sortal predication is asserted rather than presupposed

More relevant data:

(17) a. Wisdom is a property few people.

b. John’s arrival is an event that almost did not take place.

c. That S is a proposition few people believe.

Predicate-initial content is background and thus presupposed, rather than focused and thus asserted as the subsequent material

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**4. Criteria for the involvements of objects in the semantic structure of natural language: referential terms**

**4.1. Referential terms**

(18) Frege’s criterion of objecthood

An object is what a referential term stands for.

Some plausible criteria for referential terms

* Being an NP, possibly with a definite determiner
* Support of anaphora
* Replaceability by quantifiers
* Ability to occur with extensional predicates (including identity predicate)

**4.2. Quantification**

Ordinary and special quantifiers

(19) a. Socrates is wise.

b. Socrates is something admirable.

c. ??? Socrates is some admirable property.

Substitutional sorts of quantifiers

(20) a. John walked with great effort.

b. John somehow walked.

**4.3. The Meinongian claim: referential terms and quantification are not ontologically committing**

Relevant data?

(21) There are things that do not exist.

Relevant:

(22) a. The building mentioned in the guide does not exist. (Moltmann 2016)

b. There is a building mentioned in the guide that does not exist.

c. ?? There is a building that does not exist.

Conclusion:

Reference and quantification are ontologically committing only with existence-entailing predicates.

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**5. Other ways for entities to be involved in the semantic structure of sentences**

**5.1. Implicit arguments**

Davidsonian event semantics: events as implicit arguments of verbs

Alternation with referential terms: nominalizations of verbs

(23) a. John walked slowly.

b. John’s walk was slow.

Tropes as implicit arguments of adjectives and semantic values of adjective nominalizations:

(24) a. John was extremely happy.

b. John’s happiness was extreme.

Degrees, contextual standards as implicit arguments of adjectives

No term or sortal available for explicit reference.

**5.2. Contexual parameters of evaluation**

Times, worlds, situations, taste parameters etc

Explicit terms available / expected?

**5.3. Truthmakers**

Situations as truthmakers (Fine’s recent truthùaker semantics)

Explicit reference to truth makers as ‘cases (Moltmann, to appear)

Different sorts of semantic involvement reflect differences in degree of objecthood?

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**6. How the ontology of natural language may be special**

**6.1. Language created objects: pleonastic entities (Schiffer)**

‘Something-from-nothing inferences’ create new entities:

(25) a. Socrates is wise.

b. Socrates has the property of wisdom.

(26) a. 2 is prime.

b. (The proposition) That S is prime is true.

(27) a. John walked slowly.

b. John’s walk was slow.

Good candidates for the pleonastic view: reifying terms

**6.2. Discourse-driven ontology**

Discourse referents (Karttunen, Edelberg)

Information-based part structures (Moltmann 1996)

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**7. The importance of natural language ontology**

**7.1. Rectify philosophical prejudices regarding natural language**

General view: natural language allows for reference to a wealth of abstract objects:

* properties
* propositions
* numbers
* degrees
* word types

A more thorough and deeper analysis of natural language indicates that the view is fundamentally mistaken:

Moltmann (2013b):

The ontology of natural language is much more particularist. In its core, natural language does not permit reference to abstract objects, but only reference to particulars:

* tropes or trope-like objects (including quantitative tropes, number tropes),
* pluralities of particulars (including modalized pluralities or kinds),

e.g. *wisdom* is a term standing for a the plurality of (possible) wisdom tropes

*the number of planets* stands for a manifestation of ‘being eight’ in the planets

Moreover many occurrences of expressions are wrongly considered referential:

* quotations are generally nonreferential,
* predicative and sententential complements (and subjects) are nonreferential
* Moltmann (2014): More generally, sentences are not terms for propositions, but predicates of modal or attitudinal objects

The purpose of natural language ontology

Clarify what the ontology of natural language really involves before rejecting it!

Further purpose:

Provide accurate analyses of linguistic data when those are taken to motivate a philosophical view

Example 1

The relational analysis of attitude reports:

*that-*clauses as referential terms providing a propositional argument for an attitudinal relation?

Various views in philosophy of language and mind are based on that view of the logical form of attitude reports

But the logical form of attitude reports may be a very different one, involving sentences predicated of attitudinal objects.

Example 2

Apparent identity statements as specificational sentences

Specificational sentences express question – answer relation, not identity among objects

(28) a. What John is is happy.

b. ‘What is John’ – ‘John is happy’.

Applcations:

(29) a. The number of planets is eight

b. What number of planets is there? -- There are eight planets’.

(30) a. John’s belief is that S.

b. ‘What does John believe’ – John believes that S.

(31) a. The reason is that S. (Pryor)

b. What reason is there – the reason that S.

Yet another purpose

The ontology of natural language may for some areas be the right one

-- probably for propositional attitudes

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